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FINLAND

Social Democratic Party Seen in Midst of Power Struggle

Election Losses Behind Feuds

36500167 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Social Democratic Power Struggle?"]

[Text] Ilkka Suominen's predictions on Friday about a nonsocialist administration and the press debate in which they resulted, came to overshadow another interesting event on the same day: the Social Democratic mouthpiece SOSIALIDEMOKRATII's frank report of an ongoing power struggle within the party.

The report was another example of the new journalism of this previously faithfully loyal party organ.

The two most well-known examples before this one was a news item about FFC [Central Federation of Labor Unions] boss Viinanen's imminent resignation, and the "hot line" which the newspaper opened for its readers and which turned into a channel for broad dissatisfaction with the party.

Now, Demari took direct aim at his own party leadership. "Behind the Scenes at the SDP [Social Democratic Party] a Sudden-Death Play is in Progress: Already Open Fighting About Paasio's Chair" read the eye-catching headline. Inside the newspaper the headline was "Struggle for Power Shakes the SDP," with the additional quote from an anonymously interviewed "Social Democrat from the inner circle:" "A hellish competition is underway behind the scenes."

The weakness of the report is that it is founded entirely on anonymous sources—but that was apparently the only possibility of getting these sources to reveal anything.

It is therefore difficult to check the content of truth in the straightforward analysis of the situation, but it is reasonable to assume that the same principle could be applied as in the Viinanen case: no smoke without fire.

No matter how much SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRATII stresses its independence from the SDP, it is difficult to believe that a party's principal mouthpiece would go so far as to maliciously fabricate such a report.

If the information is correct, one could speak of glasnost raised to the nth degree.

For the revelations are not limited to the power struggle about the chairmanship, but go all the way back to the time the government was formed in the spring of last year.

The loss of the famous 100,000 votes in the parliamentary election led to panic in the SDP camp, and many

were prepared to let the party go into opposition, it is confirmed. That in itself is no news.

It is also no news in fact, since the reporter reminds us of the motive the SDP had to join the administration, after all: "The presidential election was imminent, and one had to get rid of Paavo Vayrynen; Vayrynen's rampaging had to be stopped and the reelection of Koivisto be assured."

What is new is that this motive is admitted this openly in the SDP press.

It is pointed out ironically that "objective preconditions were found" in favor of a red-blue government in "the Coalition Party's transformation into a center-oriented wage earner party."

The SDP camp only reluctantly accepted the new government consensus, the writer points out, but he wonders if in fact it did.

Further, it is revealed that Kalevi Sorsa wanted to "modernize" the SDP, by, among other things, pushing for Paavo Lipponen as his successor, in order just a week later, before the party convention, to make a turnaround to Minister of Internal Affairs Jarmo Rantanen, who declined, however.

The rumors about Rantanen's name have been persistent, but had not previously been confirmed.

Demari quotes "Social Democrats" who maintain that Sorsa in any event wanted to avoid the selection of Pertti Paasio.

Regarding the debate about Paasio's presence in the administration, the question is posed as to whether Paasio even wanted to join the present government at all. It is hinted that, on the contrary, he wanted to stay outside a government coalition which he does not like.

The tug-of-war within the SDP would thus apply to the government basis as well: Sorsa and Erkki Liikanen have committed themselves to red-blue, while Paasio and Ulpu Iivari are said to prefer a leftist or a popular front. These assumptions agree with observations many thought they had made from the very beginning.

And with that the report enters the power struggle around the chairmanship, which is said to be founded on the fact that "many" are of the opinion that Paasio was a "temporary solution."

Favoring that theory is, moreover, that the age difference between Sorsa, 57, and Paasio, 49, is not great.

Liipponen, 47, is not that much younger (except perhaps from the aspect of "image"), and his name is mentioned only in passing in the report. However, a source is quoted which firmly maintains that Matti Ahde, 42, and Erkki Liikanen, 37, "have not given up."

The writer reminds us that Paasio indicated Liikanen as the scapegoat when the poll people started to confirm SDP's downhill curve. On the other hand, there are those who believe that it is more likely Paasio's fumbling which is the reason.

It is hinted about Ahde that he is not satisfied with a passive role as speaker and future Veikkaus chief, but that he "tried to raise his profile," and, among other things, "constantly picks on Liikanen."

On one point Demari's analysis is surprising: Ulf Sundqvist, 43, is not mentioned in the speculations about Paasio's potential challengers.

If the information regarding a power struggle are correct—rumors have been heard from other directions as well, and dissatisfaction with Paasio was also clearly heard on Demari's "hot line"—that may also explain a recent phenomenon or two.

Perhaps Paasio posed such great demands on the ministerial post he could take over because he hesitated to go along, and tie his political fate to the government's? Would he rather see Liikanen stand and fall with the red-blue?

Perhaps Sorsa proposed Paasio for a ministerial appointment because he wanted to allow a party leader he dislikes to be exposed and worn down?

Perhaps Paasio suggested that the DFFF [Finnish People's Democratic League] should be included in an administration on a red-blue basis, because in fact he wanted to hint at something entirely different?

That proposal was supported by Sorsa, to be sure, who in addition dreamed of a united workers' party. But was it only to try to balance the government coalition with the right?

And did Lippinen demand that Sorsa make room for Paasio in the administration, in order himself to appear as the symbol for those who challenge the old party establishment?

It is only natural that a certain friction exists between SDP's new leadership duo of Paasio & Ulpu Iivari on the one hand, and the former duo of Sorsa & Liikanen on the other. The shadow of the latter duo is long.

It is only too close at hand to compare this with the relations between Harri Holkeri and Ilkka Suominen in the other leading government party. Suominen is a minister, to be sure, but he does not seem to be very happy where he is.

Center mouthpiece SUOMENMAA's comparison with "Gentlefolk and Servants" is apt: The power is concentrated to "bank directors" Holkeri and Sorsa, but the

political responsibility toward the voters lies with party leaders Suominen and Paasio, whose power is limited.

Or as ABO UNDERRATTELSE wrote yesterday: Holkeri is Suominen's overcoat, and Sorsa Paasio's.

Judging from the polls, the members and voters of the Coalition Party seem to be satisfied with this state of the matter. The power of governing is fascinating after 21 years in opposition, and Suominen may continue undisturbed as party leader, since has announced that he is stepping down in 1991.

The SDP appears to be somewhat worse off, in particular since Paasio's party leadership seems to be controversial. How will the party manage its internal rehabilitation and simultaneously try to balance between government cooperation with the right and the need to have a profile of its own?

It is surely not much consolation for the SDP that, according to a fresh opinion poll, Sorsa would now beat Vayrynen in a direct popular election for president. That was shown by another poll just a short time ago, as was the fact that he would beat even Holkeri in a second election round.

If he actually gets that far. According to the latter poll, the contest is between Holkeri and Vayrynen.

Impact of Suominen's Comments

36500167 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in
Swedish 7 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Bad Omen for the Government"]

[Text] Coalition Party leader Ilkka Suominen's prediction in UUSI SUOMI last Friday that Finland will get a nonsocialist government, was commented on the following day on this page. The debate which was caused by the move warrants some marginal notes and additional comments.

First, it might be useful to repeat what Suominen said. He thought it was not only possible, but even likely, that a nonsocialist government will be formed "within the near future."

Most immediately he referred to this being the case after the next parliamentary election, but he did not exclude the possibility that it could even take place earlier if the Holkeri administration falls, in that case most likely because the SDP wants to go into opposition.

But it could also occur "if the nonsocialists decide on it."

In the same breath Suominen confirmed his party's loyalty to the present government, which in his judgment will stay for the remainder of the election period. And he

added, interestingly enough, that he "could very well imagine that a government of this type will continue after the election as well."

Thus, he did what could be described as cover himself in all eventualities.

In press comments the move has generally been interpreted as a signal to those in the party ranks who are sceptical to a government coalition with the Social Democrats, and as a warning signal to the SDP before tax reform and budget haggling. But also as a cautious feeler in the direction of the Center opposition.

These tactical purposes are obvious, but even so one does not need to doubt Suominen's honesty in speaking for a nonsocialist government alternative. After all, he was of that opinion even after the election in the spring of last year, before he was overrun by the Koivisto-Sorsa-Holkeri trio.

Surely, the occasionally occurring sympathies for cooperation with the left within the Center Party and the SDP have also worried the Coalition Party leader, and caused him to bring up that there are several alternatives, if the red-blue coalition should founder.

Suominen's bent for nonsocialist cooperation has also been interpreted as a bad omen for Holkeri's administration.

Conspicuously few politicians have commented on Suominen's statement. No comments have been heard from the prime minister or the Social Democratic leadership, for example, and also not from the Center leadership.

Social Democrat Paavo Lipponen is right in his observation that no other obstacles have existed to a nonsocialist government than the nonsocialists themselves. Previously, the Center Party and now most recently the Coalition Party, one might add.

Lipponen also scores a bull's eye when he, addressing both Suominen and the Social Democrats who "yearn toward the left, toward the communists," is puzzled that the leader of the principal government parties "apologizes for being alive"—meaning his coexistence in the government.

Party secretary Aarno Kaila (Coalition) for his part has dismissed his party leader's ruminations with "it is good for leading politicians to discuss the future in this manner," but he was even more anxious than Suominen to emphasize their loyalty with the red-blue coalition.

By thinking that the Social Democrats "can scarcely be offended" by Suominen's talk about a nonsocialist government, he gave the impression that he wanted to smooth over and almost apologize for his party leader's outspokenness.

The same impression was given by UUSI SUOMI, close to the Coalition Party, which appeared to want to play down the entire play.

One of the party's own newspapers even corrected Suominen, to be sure without mentioning any names. But the address was clear, since the party organ considered speculations regarding for example a nonsocialist government to be a "very fruitless political discussion."

Other Coalition Party newspapers have chosen to remain totally silent. Is the silence perhaps to be interpreted in such a way that they did not approve of Suominen's way of thinking, but did not want to criticize the party leader in public?

It was interesting that perhaps the foremost backer of the red-blue foundation among independent newspapers, TURUN SANOMAT, was among those who kept silent about Suominen's play.

The relative silence in the SDP press as well might perhaps be interpreted as some form of leniency toward a fellow government member. A regional newspaper stated, however, that if Suominen does not believe in continued red-blue cooperation, it isn't worth it for others to do so either.

Isn't it a bad omen for the present government coalition that none of the principal government parties' press organs came forward to defend the coalition when Suominen indirectly questioned it?

Or did they simply not take Suominen seriously?

As expected, the comments of the Center press were all the more lively. Here, Suominen's statement, as well as the SDP leaders' proposals toward the left, was interpreted optimistically as a sign that the Holkeri administration is in a state of dissolution. Further, Suominen's invitation to a nonsocialist government was welcomed in principle.

On the other hand, the Center press did not throw its arms around Suominen's neck with any "yes, thank you," but stayed skeptical and cautious. That reflects, of course, that the Center Party, as well, wants to keep the doors open in various directions.

The general impression of the debate will be that ultimately there were few who took Suominen's move really seriously.

But those who did, among them many independent newspapers, interpreted the statement as a sign of dissolutionist tendencies in the government ranks, in particular since corresponding trends can also be recorded in the direction of the SDP.

It is clear that Suominen's nonsocialist summer dreams, like the SDP leaders' proposals to the far left, were not exactly designed to strengthen the credibility of the red-blue Holkeri administration.

The differences between Prime Minister Holkeri's and party leader Suominen's preferences were laid bare once again, in the same manner as the friction between the SDP's group of ministers and party leadership has appeared so clearly.

It might be brought up in this context that this opinion has been pushed hard on the part of the SDP, that the beginning of the end for the leftist cooperation was marked by the proposal by the Center leader, then Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, a year or so before the parliamentary election, to broaden the cooperation to include the Coalition Party. That was interpreted by Sorsa, among others, as a vote of no confidence in the government basis.

And yet Vayrynen did not propose that the SDP should be excluded.

The SDP leadership has obviously not taken Ilkka Suominen's side glances toward the possibility of a nonsocialist government equally seriously at this time. Even though such a government would not include the SDP.

Poll Confirms Socialists' Dissatisfaction
36500167 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in
Swedish 13 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Dissatisfied Master, Satisfied Farm Hand"]

[Text] Our colleague UUSI SUOMI has commissioned a two-part opinion poll, which at least apparently gives contradictory results.

On the one hand people—even the Social Democrats themselves—think the SDP has the upper hand over the Coalition Party in the government.

On the other, SDP people are dissatisfied with their own party.

Thus, there appears to be a paradox involved, that the Social Democrats are dissatisfied with having influence! A dissatisfied master—whose farm hands are all the more satisfied? That invites closer scrutiny of the figures in *Taloustutkimus'* poll.

The question of which principal government party dominates in the government is only a measurement of the subjective image the citizens have. In politics, however, such subjective opinions are far from meaningless. Decisions to vote are often made on the basis of such conceptions, rather than on the basis of factual information.

The citizens' experiences also have special relevance in a situation where government construction is built on a sensitive balance: On the one hand the Coalition Party is supported by a slim nonsocialist majority and also occupies the prime minister post, on the other hand the SDP is the largest and has more so-called heavy ministerial posts.

Of all those asked, 36 percent believe the SDP has the upper hand, while 22 percent are of the opinion that the Coalition Party does. What is interesting, however, is the trend: Since October last year the share of those who believe the SDP is dominant has increased from 27 to 36 percent, and those who are betting on the Coalition Party only from 20 to 22 percent.

The result is a little embarrassing for the administration's nonsocialist majority—and nonsocialist prime minister. It shows that many citizens are of the opinion that the government is dominated by its own minority.

The image is surely connected with the SDP's long experience in government, while the Coalition Party is a novice. That explains, among other things, why the SDP dominates the public better than the Coalition Party.

But the experience could also have a real background, primarily because the so-called renewal in working life has generally been interpreted as a victory for the SDP and a defeat for the nonsocialists. On the issue of tax reform, which was to be the nonsocialists' "revenge," the SDP has managed to keep the Coalition Party in check, or even on tenterhooks.

However, the most interesting part is how different the supporters of various parties perceive the dominance within the administration.

Those SDP members, who believe their own party is the dominant, have increased from 22 to 33 percent since October. On the other hand, one out of five SDP supporters thinks the Coalition Party dominates.

This is the opinion of (only!) one out of five Coalition Party members, which indicates that the party's supporters do not trust their own party's strength and influence. The share of Coalition Party members who believe the SDP is the dominant party has increased from 34 percent to 47, however.

The fact that half of the Coalition Party's voters thus believe that the Social Democratic government minority has the upper hand, is a difficult result for the prime minister's party, to say the least.

Moreover, one of the party's newspapers, POHJALAINEN, is totally silent about that figure, as it tries to downgrade and explain away the entire result of the poll in its commentary!

It is scarcely surprising that Center Party supporters find the SDP dominant and the People's Democrats find the Coalition Party so. After all, it is in the interest of the respective opposition party to believe precisely that.

It could easily be concluded from people's opinions of who is the dominant in the government that Coalition Party members are the most dissatisfied, and the Social Democrats relatively content. But the second part of UUSI SUOMI's poll speaks another language.

In this part those interviewed were asked to grade both their own and other parties. It is only natural for them to give their own party a higher grade than others.

What is interesting, however, is that the difference between the supporters and everyone else's evaluation is clearly the smallest for the Social Democrats, followed by the Coalition Party and the People's Democrats. SDP people are expressly more dissatisfied with their party than others with theirs.

So it is a matter of a new piece of evidence added to the others, of a growing dissatisfaction in Social Democratic ranks. Several polls have indicated that the SDP is losing yet another 100,000 voters, beyond the 100,000 who fled the party in the parliamentary election. Further, the dissatisfaction has found a clear expression in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRATII's columns.

Why then this contradiction? It seems illogical for the Social Democrats simultaneously to believe they dominate the government and to be dissatisfied.

A simple explanation could be that the answers to the question of who is the greater power in the administration reflect only a "neutral" statement of fact, but that the Social Democrats nevertheless are discontented with the policies of this administration. Thus, it would involve frustrated hopes.

Perhaps the "big SDP success" in reforming working life simply does not interest the voters, and in any event the joy is overshadowed by fear of the tax reform.

The matter does not improve by the fact that SDP's change of party leadership can be considered to have failed; partly, it stopped halfway because the old leadership duo dominates the group of ministers, and, partly, there is smouldering dissatisfaction with the new party leader.

In an interview for UUSI SUOMI, Social Democratic dissident (speaker of the truth?) Erkki Tuomioja brings up two explanations for the declining voter support of and growing dissatisfaction with the party.

He believes that the SDP has "lost" its ideology, and only "reacts to the issues brought up by the governing." "We have no program of our own, no view of our own of

how society should change," he says and goes so far as to say: "If a person says he is a Social Democrat, it says nothing about his view of the world."

Tough words, which are not softened when Tuomioja states that the SDP "can only lose" from the government coalition with the right. He predicts that the government will not stay in power for the entire mandate period, and he thinks that a period in opposition—although it risks being a long one—would be "favorable" for the party.

On its editorial page UUSI SUOMI itself comes to the conclusion from the contradictory poll, that "both principal government parties should now polish up their own image for the voters, without striving for artificial agreement, not to mention similarity."

The conclusion is logical. The question is only what the result will be if both SDP and the Coalition Party raise their profiles before this fall's already extremely difficult budget negotiations, which include an agreement on tax reform.

Perhaps Tuomioja may have his wishes granted, for a useful opposition period for his party.

Socialists Cool Toward Sorsa

36500167 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in
Swedish 17 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Nonsocialist Duel Also Bisects"]

[Text] At this rate, there is time for many presidential election polls until January 1994.

The polls that have been taken have originated from two assumptions, which are not necessarily correct.

One is that President Koivisto is no longer a candidate. After the vague messages given throughout this year's election campaign, that is a reasonable assumption. But both foreign and domestic policy factors could change that situation.

The second deals with who the candidates are. No nominations will be in the picture for several years yet, but pollsters assume that the principal candidates are Harri Holkeri, Kalev Kivistö, Kalevi Sorsa and Paavo Vayrynen. That assumption is also correct, but the question marks are several.

For Holkeri and Kivistö it would be their third candidacy. It is therefore possible that Kivistö, in particular, may hesitate to "sacrifice himself," particularly since of the four mentioned in all likelihood he has the smallest chance of winning.

As for Holkeri, other factors could surface. How credible would his candidacy be, for example, if the red-blue government coalition, with which he has identified so much, comes to an ignoble end?

Already voices have been raised within the Coalition Party for an effort on behalf of Ilkka Suominen instead. Holkeri's ranking so far has only developed in a negative direction: number two in 1982, but only third in 1988.

As for Sorsa, the same question can be asked as for Holkeri: What happens if the government coalition, of which Sorsa was the prime author, founders?

Moreover, Sorsa is the only one of the four who has already been "nominated," so to speak, by the fact that SDP boss Paasio publicly mentioned his name.

It has recently been assumed that Vayrynen, since coming in number two in this year's election, before Holkeri, who had been predicted by the polls, will be a candidate for the second time. But for him as well, a few question marks must be noted in the margin: What happens if the Center Party headed by Vayrynen is still in opposition after the 1991 parliamentary election?

Further, parties other than the four largest ones can also nominate candidates. In a direct popular election, candidates of small parties are given little chance. But that depends on the person, of course.

And in any event, a Green, a Swede or a Rural Party candidate, for instance, could shuffle the cards for the "big" candidates, particularly as regards those who make it to a potential second election round.

But for lack of more real starting points the pollsters are relegated to the names of Holkeri, Kivistö, Sorsa and Vayrynen.

These were also the names on which the most recent poll was based, which was taken in May with almost 1,000 Finns and which has now been published in SUOMEN KUVALEHTI.

For the first time the poll included non-voting-age groups, which will be of voting age in 1994. Even 15- to 17-year-olds were thus asked. One could have gone down even to 13-year-olds, but that would hardly have been very meaningful.

The poll gave a clear-cut result: If the election had been held now, our next president would have been called Harri Holkeri—regardless of the election system used. The poll also measured opinions regarding so-called acceptance elections and what is called the ranking system. There may be reason to return to this further on.

In the first round of a direct popular election, Holkeri would be number one with 27 percent of the votes (31.5 if only those are included who have made up their mind), Vayrynen

number two with 21 (25.3), Kivistö number three with 18 (21.7) and Sorsa last, also with 18 percent (21.5).

This means that the two nonsocialist candidates Holkeri and Vayrynen would oppose one another in a decisive runoff election! And then Holkeri would win with 49 percent against 36 (15 had no opinion).

Holkeri would also defeat Sorsa, if those two were to oppose one another, by the percentages 44 to 39 (17 "blank" votes).

Sorsa, in turn, would beat Vayrynen by the percentages 48 to 39 in the (according to the poll therefore unlikely) situation that these two would be opponents.

But according to the poll, Sorsa would not reach the second round, but, on the contrary, place last of all in the first round!

The poll assumes that the presidential election is a direct popular election in two rounds. If the reform planned by the government is not completed in time, however, the voters would decide the Holkeri-Vayrynen duel.

If the present government base continues until 1994, perhaps the Social Democratic voters prefer Holkeri. But what happens if we have a leftist government or a nonsocialist government?

The opinion poll offers several interesting partial results.

The most notable one is the differences between various age groups. In the youngest category (15-24), nonsocialists Holkeri and Vayrynen are supreme favorites with a total of 58 percent of the votes—against only 28 for the candidates of the left. Once again this confirms how nonsocialist today's youth is—and therefore the direction in which the opinion climate is developing. The question is only if young people vote.

In the 50-69 age group, on the other hand, all four candidates get about 20 percent support.

The only age category in which Vayrynen would beat any one opponent in a second round is the youngest one, where Sorsa would find himself defeated by 51 percent against 38 percent.

The only category where Sorsa would beat Holkeri is the oldest, in which he wins with 45-37.

Various party members' votes in a first election round follow the expected pattern, except on one dramatic point: While Kivistö has 81 percent of the DFFF [People's Democratic League] supporters' (and the DA people's [not further identified]) votes, Vayrynen has 79 percent of the Center Party supporters and Holkeri 75 percent of the Coalition Party members, while Sorsa has to be satisfied with only a scant majority (56 percent) of the Social Democrats' votes. That is a poor starting point for any presidential candidate.

Sorsa's dilemma stands out especially clearly since it turns out that only 72 percent of his own party's voters would prefer him over conservative Holkeri, if the decisive round were played between these two. One out of four SDP people would vote for Holkeri!

The voters of the other parties are considerably more faithful to their own candidates. Against Sorsa Holkeri gets 89 percent and against Vayrynen 88 percent of the Coalition Party votes, while against Sorsa Vayrynen gets 89 percent and against Holkeri 83 percent of the Center votes.

It is interesting how the voters of the three major parties would vote when their own candidate is beaten: Two out of three SDP people prefer Holkeri to Vayrynen, slightly more Coalition Party supporters support Sorsa than Vayrynen and clearly more Center people prefer Holkeri than Sorsa. Vayrynen has a majority of the DFFF voters against Holkeri.

Among the curiosities is that the supporters of the Rural Party to begin with split their votes evenly between Kivistö, Sorsa and Vayrynen, while the leftist candidates are favorites of the Greens. This confirms the Rural Party's ambivalent position in the political field, and the leftist sympathies of the Greens. On the other hand, the Greens prefer conservative Holkeri to the Center Party's Vayrynen....

Finally, the Kuvalehti poll confirms the major regional differences in the candidates' popularity figures: Holkeri and Sorsa are most popular in the south, while Vayrynen is the easy favorite in central and northern Finland.

In the south, the votes are distributed between Holkeri, Sorsa and Vayrynen in the ratios 32-22-13, in central Finland 22-10-34, and in the north 15-16-31. Vayrynen is thus just as popular in central and northern Finland as Holkeri and Sorsa combined!

That is a confirmation of the "new bisection" of the nation, to which above all the red-blue government coalition has contributed.

From a geographic aspect, in this year's presidential election Mauno Koivisto received the most votes in two-thirds of Finland. The way Harri Holkeri's potential voter support now seems to distribute itself, he is number one only in one-third of Finland. That would be a troublesome starting point for a president.

11949

Paper Views Latest Challenge to Vennamo in Rural Party

36500162 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Aug 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Pragmatism or Protest"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] Within the Finnish Rural Party [FLP] there is a split between the pragmatic line of Pekka Vennamo and a line

of protest and discontent led by Urpo Leppanen, Björn Mansson writes just before the FLP party congress.

The party congresses are not over for the summer. This weekend the Finnish Rural Party will gather in Lahti for its 30th party congress.

By the way, with 30 years behind it, the FLP belongs to the older half of our now 14 (!) registered parties. Thus, the FLP can no longer present itself as an alternative to the "older parties."

The FLP congress is meeting in a time of conflict for the party:

In his capacity of party leader and only cabinet minister, Pekka Vennamo has his party in a firm grip. He will remain as long as he himself sees fit and it would be extremely surprising if the party were to go against his policy on any important issue.

At the same time, a growing discontent with the party's participation in the government is making itself known. At the center of this discontent is former party secretary and cabinet minister, the present parliamentary group leader, Urpo Leppanen.

To be sure, there is reason for dissatisfaction.

It occurs on the background of a disastrous loss in the parliamentary elections, in which the FLP lost more than one-third of its voters and its seats in parliament were reduced from 17 to 9.

The election defeat was followed by the humiliation the party suffered when the Holkeri government was formed. For the sake of a delicate balance the SDP [Social Democratic Party], in particular, needed the participation of the FLP, but the latter had to be satisfied with just one cabinet post—even though it received a greater number of votes than the SFP [Swedish People's Party], which received two cabinet positions.

In addition, the post of Transportation Minister has proved to be quite difficult because of the reorganization that has been carried out within the national railway system and the postal and telecommunications services. These measures were not exactly popular among the rural population where the party has its traditional supporters.

The next humiliation was the decision that the FLP's greatest accomplishment of the previous government, the new employment law, would be implemented in stages.

The election of electors last winter proved to be another defeat for the party, even though it was trying to reelect the incumbent president.

This year the polls have been even more unfriendly than usual to the FLP. Voter support for the party seems to have dropped by almost half since the parliamentary elections. According to one opinion poll, no less than one-third of the FLP voters now prefer the Center Party.

Leppanen has admitted that the FLP and the Center are like communicating vessels in this respect.

Otherwise, it seems that FLP members do not know how to deal with the figures in the polls. The party newspaper, SUOMEN UUTISET, explained in its most recent issue that the polls are a fraud.

In the same paper, Pekka Venhamo called the opinion polls a propaganda tool and accused the pollsters of working on behalf of certain parties.

"Regardless of whether the polls are right or wrong, there is no reason to believe them," according to the minister's logic.

In this regard, Venhamo supports those (including Prime Minister Holkeri and Justice Minister Louekoski) who would ban polls before elections. Venhamo, himself, believes the ban should stretch "at least several months" before an election!

In a recent newspaper interview Party Secretary Aaro Niiranen stated that, for his part, he was not surprised by his party's lack of success in the polls. He explained it by the fact that the party does not run candidates in all municipalities during local elections—as if people gave a thought to that when they stated their party preference in the polls.

Whatever the case, Urpo Leppanen now sees his chance in the difficult situation in which the FLP finds itself.

As early as the fall of last year, when implementation of the law on employment was postponed, Leppanen demanded that the FLP leave the government.

In an interview with UUSI SUOMI, just in time for the party congress, he has now repeated this opinion.

It is now longer necessary to be in the government, according to Leppanen. If participation in the government does not yield results, then it is not worth the effort to "suffer endlessly." After the local elections, the party must reexamine the situation.

He added that a reassessment could come before that, in connection with the budget negotiations: "if we get nothing of what we want, we should leave the government."

Leppanen believes that Pekka Venhamo made a mistake when he broke with his father Veikko and says "straight out" that the FLP should remain a protest movement.

The way in which Leppanen uses the words "protest movement" as something exclusively positive, almost as

a badge of honor, is reminiscent of a recent dissertation written by a young FLP member.

It openly refers to the FLP as a populist party and compares it to the classical so-called Poujadism of France and to the Progressive Parties of Denmark and Norway. The historical development of the FLP is divided into the following periods: "strict populism," the "intermediate period of populism" (from 1979 to 1986), and "adapted populism" (from 1986 on).

At least this is an honest description by a party member.

Urpo Leppanen is not alone in his discontent. In the parliamentary group he has the support of Marita Jurva, at least, who issued a private press release this week in which she asked what positive results had come from participation in the government. "If we do not achieve such results in the near future, my patience will run out and I will demand that the FLP leave the government," she wrote.

In stark contrast to the smoldering discontent out in the party, the party leadership seems extremely satisfied with the party's role and its influence in the government.

Last spring Pekka Venhamo stated in an interview with HUFVUDSTADSLADET that the FLP has "more say-so" in the present government than in the previous one and in NYKYPAIVA, the party paper of the Coalition Party, Party Secretary Niiranen stated that "the position of the smaller parties in the present government is better than in the previous government." He praises the Coalition Party, in particular, for letting the FLP (and the SFP) "breathe freer."

The opposite is heard from the SFP.

The party's loyalty to the government becomes downright tragicomic when SUOMEN UUTISET dismisses the "so-called opinion polls with which some have attempted to claim that the majority of the nation opposes" tax reform. Not even other government party papers have been so cocksure of themselves.

Consequently, it is clear that there are two opposing lines within the Rural Party, now as before: Pekka Venhamo's pragmatic policy of results, centered around participation in the government at almost any cost, and the wing under the leadership of Urpo Leppanen that wants to raise high Veikko Venhamo's banner of protest and discontent.

Since no one can seriously challenge, let alone threaten, Pekka Venhamo's leadership of the party, the two sides will test their strength at the Lahti congress in the election of a deputy chairman. Party veteran Kalle Palosaari is stepping down and one of the aspirants to his position is Urpo Leppanen, who failed in his attempt last fall to regain Niiranen's position as party secretary.

Pekka Venamo has let it be known that he would not be pleased if Leppanen were to win. It remains to be seen if, on this point as well, the foot soldiers will do their leader's bidding.

After the party congress, the FLP will face two new challenges: the budget negotiations in which the party, as usual, has made many demands and the local elections in October, which may be even more difficult than usual for this party, which has always done worse in local than in parliamentary elections.

The left-right coalition government may need the Rural Party to maintain the legitimacy of itself and of its policies vis-a-vis the rural population, underdeveloped regions, and those classes of people who have the least.

The question, however, is whether or not the Rural Party needs the government—or, on the contrary, if it must leave the government in order to survive.

09336

Communist Party Concerned About Hungarian Minority in Romania
36500166 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 19 Aug 88 p 10

[Article by Bjarne Nitovuori]

[Text] Finland's Communist Party is concerned over the situation of the Hungarian minority in the Transylvania area of Romania. The Party's Politburo, yesterday, sent a letter to the Romanian Communist Party, expressing its worry over the situation in Transylvania and the fact that relations between two socialist countries—Romania and Hungary—and two brother communist parties had consequently worsened.

This issue has been a difficult one for the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). The SKP has traditionally had good relations with the Romanian party. In discussions within the Finnish party over the past few weeks, one of the assertions has been that the Romanian party was the only one in the socialist countries which has wholeheartedly supported the majority wing during the bitter internal strife within the SKP. The others, with the Soviet Communist Party in the lead, sympathized more or less openly with the minority [hard-line] wing.

Now, however, the party is taking a cautious but clear position toward Romania. The Romanian leaders so far have rejected all protest, asserting that the Hungarians have an equal standing in Romania, and that such protests constitute an interference in the country's internal affairs.

The SKP, though, considers this to be no longer just an internal matter. The issue is affecting the other communist parties with regard to the success. The issue also affects the credibility of all those who are struggling for democracy, says the Finnish communist Party.

However, the SKP expresses its solidarity with the Romanian party in its struggle to overcome the country's difficulties, and hopes that relations between the two parties will continue developing in the future.

A Common Nordic Stand?

The [Finnish] Communist Party is the first party in the country to officially as a group take a position on the situation in Transylvania. The European conservative and Christian Democratic parties in their joint organization, the EDU [European Democratic Union] condemned treatment of the Hungarian minority by Romanian authorities at a meeting in Helsinki at the end of June and beginning of July. The meeting was presided over by the leader of the [Finnish] Conservative Party, Ilkka Suominen, who is the organization's deputy chairman.

The Swedish People's Party [of Finland] is attempting to get the Liberal International to take a stand on this issue at a meeting to be held in Pisa in the middle of September. The matter is being prepared under the leadership of Swedish People's Party General Secretary Peter Stenlund.

Stenlund also thinks that the matter could be considered on the Nordic level, for example at the next meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers. For this to happen, the matter must first be discussed by the individual governments.

Of the other Finnish political parties, only the Social Democrats have relations with the Romanian Communist Party.

The Hungarian minority in Romania is officially estimated at a little over 1.7 million in 10-year-old figures, but according to Hungarian estimates, it is closer to 2.5 million. Treatment of the minority, which is the largest in Europe, has long given cause for revolts.

The situation has become more acute over the past few months, when it was learned the [Romanian] authorities are planning a sweeping program to eliminate 7,000 villages and replace them with "agrar-industrial" complexes. A large portion of the Hungarian minority resides in the villages which are to be affected.

GREECE

Poll Reveals Personalities' Attraction Preferences 35210133a Athens ENA in Greek 14 Jul 88 pp 12-14

[Text] Seriously, which are the special features a politician must have to attract the interest of Greek voters? What does a citizen mean when he states he is "captivated" by some cabinet minister, deputy, or party official? Who today are the "stars" on the political stage, public personalities—men and women who are considered by the public as having the greatest charm? Answers to these questions are given by a special public opinion poll conducted on behalf of ENA by the Media Plan, the Center of Communication Studies. The poll used a sample of 649 persons in the Attiki Basin region and used the "random" method. It centered on three themes: When do we regard a person to be charming? Who is the male politician, in or out of parliament [Vouli] regarded as the most charming? Who among Greek women politicians is the most charming?

It is worth noting that all three questions were "open," without, that is, showing those polled a list of names to select from among specific persons. In this way the responses were not only sincere but also spontaneous—and therefore very indicative.

According to the responses, 50.8 percent of the public regards dynamism and decisiveness as sources of a politician's attractiveness; 36.8 percent regard the way a person speaks; and 12.4 percent a person's good looks.

Dynamic personalities are enchanting. Starting with male politicians, the most attractive are A. Papandreou with a 20.4 percent and K. Karamanlis with 13.1 percent. Mitsotakis is the next with 6.4 percent.

Two PASOK personalities are at the same attractiveness level: G. Gennimatas and A. Tritsis with 4.9 percent each. Next is L. Kyros with 4.4 percent; A. Tsokhatzopoulos, who is often called handsome in the non-political columns, received only 3.3 percent. Next is K. Stefanopoulos with 3.1 percent; G. Kharalambopoulos with 2.0; and finally, M. Evert who, although he is considered a dynamic politician, is limited to only 2.2 percent.

The results of the poll are particularly interesting when it comes to the charm politicians exert on men and women voters. The premier is more attractive to men voters (15.2 percent) than to women (1.31). By contrast K. Karamanlis' charm appears to have gone up among women. The poll shows 9.5 percent among women while the corresponding percentage among men is 8.6. The leader of the opposition (Mitsotakis), although publicly shows an image of the ideal husband in every appearance with his wife Marika, does not seem to do very well with women. While 7.0 percent of men find him attractive, only 2.1 percent of women do so. On the other side, A. Tritsis is more attractive to women (3.9 percent) than to men (2.9).

Gennimatas and Tsokhatzopoulos are liked equally by men and women since their percentages seem to be the same with both sexes. Stefanopoulos is preferred more by men and Kharalambopoulos by women. It appears that the mayor of Athens (Evert) has the same problem as Mitsotakis. His percentage among men is 2.9 percent, while among women it is 0.3.

Let us now see the degree of attractiveness of our male politicians in terms of the respondent's age.

A. Papandreou is preferred by men and women 30-44 years old and by those who are over 60, by 14 and 16.7 percent, respectively. Karamanlis is attractive to those over 45 and Mitsotakis to the "dynamic" ages between 30 and 44.

Tritsis is attractive to the young people (18 to 29) who give him 8.4 percent—the highest among this age group—while those over 60 give him 0.6 percent, a level he shares with Deputy Premier Giannis Kharalambopoulos.

The percentages for Evert show an interesting spread. The 18 to 29 age group gives him 3.6 percent, while in other age groups his percentages are lower. The educational level of the respondents seems to affect responses.

A. Papandreou is more attractive to people with primary school education (15.3 percent), while Karamanlis is more attractive to those with higher and university education (11.4 percent) and less to a high school (8.5) and primary school graduates (8.2). Mitsotakis' case is similar to that of the premier—5.3 percent among primary school and 4.6 among high school graduates. Gennimatas is more attractive to university graduates. The same applies to Tritsis and L. Kyros [of the Greek Left]. Tsokhatzopoulos is more attractive to those of primary school education while Evert is more attractive to high school graduates.

Melina, Maria, and Anna—what about the women? Naturally, Melina Mercouri has transferred her movie star glamour to the political stage. She is first with 35 percent! Second in line is Maria Damanaki with 15.7 percent. Third, another former actress, Anna Synodinou with 6.6 percent. Fourth, S. Akrita with 5.3. Then Vaso Papandreou [no relation to the premier] with 4.7 percent, Aimilia Ypsilanti with 3.6, and Margaret Papandreou with 3 percent. Three entirely different ladies are next: R. Kaklamanaki with 2.8; L. Katseli with 2.7; and finally, Fani Petralia.

Who is the most charming female politician depending on the sex of the respondent? M. Mercouri is equally attractive to men and women. By contrast, M. Damanaki, Deputy Speaker of Vouli is more attractive to men who give her 14 percent while the corresponding percentage among women is 8.9 percent. The same applies to Vaso Papandreou with 4.4 among men and 2.4 among

women. By contrast, Aim. Ypsilanti and Margaret Papandreou are more attractive among women with 3.6 and 2.4 percent, respectively.

Melina Mercouri crosses age groups! The young between 18 and 29 years old find her most attractive, giving her 31.9 percent. But her percentages are high in all age groups. M. Damanaki is attractive to all ages and her percentages do not change much from one age group to the other. A. Synodinou is more attractive to people between 45 and 59, while S. Akrita to those over 60. A special case is that of Vaso Papandreou who appears to attract the young (18 to 29) and the old (over 60). Kaklamanaki and Petralia are attractive to those between 45 and 59 while their percentages among the young do not go over 1 percent. Petralia is more attractive to those over 60 than the Deputy Minister of Education Kaklamanaki.

Preferences change significantly depending on the education level of those polled. Melina Mercouri again comes first with 20 percent; Damanaki is preferred by those of higher and university education; the same applies to Synodinou. Surprisingly, V. Papandreou and P. Kaklamanaki attract most of those with primary school education.

Table I. Who Is Considered Attractive

| | Percent of Sample | Percent of Respondents |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Mainly when good looking | 11.5 | 12.4 |
| Mainly when dynamic and decisive | 47.1 | 50.8 |
| Mainly when he speaks beautifully | 34.0 | 36.8 |
| I don't know/No answer | 7.4 | — |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table II. Who Is the Most Attractive Male Politician

| | Percent of Sample | Percent of Respondents |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| A. Papandreou | 14.1 | 20.4 |
| K. Karamanlis | 9.0 | 13.1 |
| K. Mitsotakis | 4.4 | 6.4 |
| A. Tritsis | 3.4 | 4.9 |
| G. Gennimatas | 3.4 | 4.9 |
| L. Kyros | 3.1 | 4.4 |
| A. Tsokhatzopoulos | 2.3 | 3.3 |
| K. Stefanopoulos | 2.1 | 3.1 |
| G. Kharalambopoulos | 2.0 | 2.9 |
| M. Evert | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| No one | 12.6 | 18.1 |
| Various others | 11.4 | 16.3 |
| I don't know/No answer | 30.7 | — |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table III. Who Is the Most Attractive Female Politician

| | Percent of Sample | Percent of Respondents |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| M. Mercouri | 25.3 | 35.0 |
| M. Damanaki | 11.3 | 15.7 |
| A. Synodinou | 4.8 | 6.6 |
| S. Akrita | 3.8 | 5.3 |
| V. Papandreou | 3.4 | 4.7 |
| Aim. Ypsilanti | 2.6 | 3.6 |
| Marg. Papandreou | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| R. Kaklamanaki | 2.0 | 2.8 |
| F. Petralia | 1.8 | 2.5 |
| L. Katseli | 1.2 | 2.7 |
| No one | 10.9 | 15.0 |
| Various others | 3.2 | 4.1 |
| I don't know/No answer | 27.6 | — |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 |

The public opinion poll has one more interesting result: 30 percent of those questioned refused to answer—11.4 percent of men and 3.2 percent of women named other persons. And 11 percent replied that they do not like any male or female politician in Greece.

7520/12232

ICELAND

Prime Minister Palsson on Women's List, EC, Security Policy

36500146 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 16 Jul 88 p 2

[Interview by Hakan Hagwall: "Summer Conversation: Prime Minister Thorsteinn Palsson: Iceland's Duty To Preserve the Nordic Heritage"]

[Excerpts] At the Leifur Eriksson terminal at Keflavik Airport, I am talking with a lone gentleman who arrived on the same plane as I did from Stockholm. When my 9-year-old daughter realizes that he is the prime minister of Iceland, she asks:

"What have you vetoed?"

He answers that he is more in favor of allowing than disallowing. During his term as prime minister, the number of laws repealed is approximately twice the number of laws enacted.

For 1 year, the Icelandic government has been led by a Conservative, the chairman of the Independence Party, Thorsteinn Palsson.

Several days after our encounter at the airport, the prime minister goes with me on a trip. The trip begins outside the Government House, where his office and the president's office are located, which, in view of its function, is

a very modest villa at Lackjargata. The house was built by the Danes in the 18th century; it has served as a prison and later as the office of the Danish governor.

"People tend to refer to it as the slammer," says the prime minister.

We leave Reykjavik, first we drive to the north a stretch and then inland.

Strain

Thorsteinn talks about a busy political spring. According to Icelandic name custom, the prime minister is *named* Thorsteinn; he *is* Palsson. The three-party coalition government, which consists of his own party, the Independence Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Progressive Party which is a middle party in Iceland, has been rocky. The economic strain has been harder than usual, and it has been difficult to agree on the counter-measures. However, with a provisional law, the government agreed on the year's second devaluation in May, and immediately afterwards on a combined restraint and booster package as the most startling feature. The law expanded the agreement which has already been reached in the spring to encompass the entire labor market; thereby, strikes are prohibited for the year ahead.

"It was the high wage earners who had not reached an agreement. The objective of the law was to protect the buying power of the people with the lowest income," says the prime minister.

Thorsteinn does not doubt that the problem is the Icelandic economy:

"A society that bases such a large part of its economy on only one industry will have problems. The dominating part of our export is fish and fish products. The entire country swings with fishing and fish prices. During the last 3 years, we have had tremendous economic growth. There was an increase in the catch and the price rose. The buying power of Icelanders also went up—last year, it went up by 18 percent. But then the dollar falls; then the prices fall and then the national income drops. It is extremely difficult to withdraw public expenditure and take away buying power. This comes in waves, it happens to us again and again."

It is no coincidence that the continuously lighter Icelandic krona has a fish engraved on it.

Balance

The three-party government's ambitious program for a comprehensive economic balance is a 3-year plan. A balanced national budget was attained immediately, but it is likely that the entire period is needed to reach a balance in foreign trade.

"But I am hopeful," says Thorsteinn, who thinks that the political situation will stabilize after the measures to counter the economic crisis. The problem was only to reach an agreement within the government.

However, the opposition in the Althing, the Icelandic parliament, does not give rise to too much concern, at least not at this time. It consists of three parties: the People's Alliance, the Glistrup-like Citizens' Party which is led by a separatist from the Independence Party, as well as the Women's List. The opposition parties do not have much in common beyond their dissatisfaction with the government. Collectively, they are weak in the Althing and two of them have lost support, according to the public opinion polls.

The Women's List

But the third party continues to be a disturbing factor. The Women's List shows enormous increase in support in the opinion polls. According to new surveys, it is now ahead of the Independence Party and thereby the strongest political party in Iceland.

"In all practicality, the Women's List leads the opposition in the Althing. The party has received sympathetic ears from most quarters, but it is, of course, a leftist party which is against NATO and for larger public spending. On the other hand, they never talk about higher taxation," says Thorsteinn.

"I believe that the boom the Women's List is enjoying is temporary. The leading opposition party gets a boost when the buying power falls."

Well, what can Iceland actually afford? In fact, the country is a puzzle. How is it possible to have such developed structure? They have almost everything a nation needs except its own defense force. Schools, university, health care, rich cultural life, mass media offerings, etc., are available. All this with a population of a quarter of a million.

Where Is the Limit?

[Question] Where do you put the limit of what you can do?

[Answer] We do not discuss that. We want to continue to expand the limit. It is clear that we must set priorities each time. But we can always go further, strengthen and broaden the production, improve the welfare system and allow room for cultural life. There is no limit.

[Question] How is this possible?

[Answer] We work hard. What drives us is a strong sense of independence. We must have our own and take care of ourselves. A strong Icelandic cultural life is especially important.

But as you see, we cannot afford everything at once, paved roads everywhere, for example.

The drive has been somewhat bumpy. Thorsteinn talks about the priorities of communications in this extremely sparsely populated country: a 12-year plan to lay a permanent surface on the ring road around the country and the other main roads, as well as a concentrated effort to build airports around the country.

Europe

As the national conservative that he is, he is also a European. But he does not expect Iceland to become a member of the European Community [EC].

"We simply cannot share our fish with other nations, which we would have to do because of the EC fishing policy.

But it is necessary for us to move closer to the European economy. Now, 50-60 percent of our export now goes to the EC countries. We must keep up with the progress.

The prime minister expresses eagerness for establishing foreign industry in Iceland. Among other things, Iceland can offer a good and secure energy supply for an aluminum plant, for example.

Belong to the West

The ties to Europe, however, are primarily ideological, underscores the prime minister.

"Our security policy solution is politically sound, but above all, it is historically self-explanatory. We belong to the West.

Neutrality would not help us. If there is a war, a superpower will be in Iceland. That is what we found out in 1940. Fortunately, the British arrived before the Germans. There was a broad political group, in fact, consisting of the three parties that now are in the government, behind our entry into NATO in 1949 and our defense agreement with the United States.

For the parties that are opposed to our membership in NATO, the issue has now lost much of its appeal. It lacks national appeal. The support for the NATO policy in the Althing is dependable. Iceland has never been a footnote country.

Thorsteinn calls attention to a sometimes overlooked obvious fact:

"It is important for Finland and Sweden that Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of NATO. It creates a balance and strengthens the position of Sweden and Finland.

Voter Contact

After several hours at Thingvellir, Thorsteinn Palsson continues on to Selfoss in the southern part of the country which is his own electoral district. He visits there once a week to meet party members and voters. Iceland has 63 members of parliament and around 170,000 voters. Each mandate requires 2,700 votes. It is a fair demand that an Icelandic politician knows his voters and allows them to get to know him.

"This, of course, does not change because one becomes the prime minister," says Thorsteinn when we depart.

The Inflation Curse

In Icelandic cartoons, inflation is portrayed as an all-consuming dragon. The fight against inflation has been the hardest burden, most often too great a burden, for every prime minister.

A break in this trend occurred when a nonsocialist majority government came to power in 1983. The inflation was then up to 130 percent; the average inflation rate in 1983 was 84 percent. For a long time, the routine had been too high wage agreements which were followed by the governments' by devaluation, after which the wages were adjusted upwards every quarter in accordance with index clauses in the agreement, followed by new devaluation and so on.

In 1983, the government succeeded in removing the index clauses, and it was able to push the inflation down to 29 percent in 1984. The average inflation rate has since then been 32.5 percent in 1985, 21.5 percent in 1986 and 18 percent in 1987. Recent prediction for 1988 points to 28 percent.

The Icelandic krona has been devalued twice this year, 6 percent in March and 10 percent in May. In May, law was passed for obligatory freeze on the wage agreement for 1 year and a ban against index clauses on short loans, among other things.

9583

NORWAY

Study Finds Great Degree of Stability Among 'Red' Voters

36390083 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Jul 88 p 3

[Guest commentary by Tron Ogrim: "This Is the Way Leftist Norway Votes"]

[Text] The Reds in Norway constitute a very stable and isolated subculture within Norwegian society. This is the conclusion drawn by Marxist-Leninist Tron Ogrim after studying election statistics for the post-World War II period. The Leftist vote, which he calls the Radical

Number showed an amazing degree of stability from 1945 to last year's municipal elections. We have chosen to retain his language usage in this article.

Here is an unusual election statistic: Radical (or Red) votes to the left of the Labor Party in all parliamentary and municipal elections since World War II. It is the entire electorate of the following parties: the Communist Party, the Socialist-Left Party, the Radical Liberal Party, the small Norwegian Social Democratic Party (1957-61), and the Socialist People's Party (1961-69). I refer to this entire electorate as the *Radical Number* (*R*).

R [The Red vote] shows an amazing degree of stability. In most municipal elections, the votes cast for the Communist Party in 1945-49 are clearly reflected in *R* of 1987.

The stability of *R* is particularly striking from 1975 to 1987. Take, for example, Oslo: *R* is at a certain level in 1975-79, takes a leap, and settles at a new, very stable level in 1981-88. However, the Socialist-Left Party and the Radical Liberal Party fluctuate greatly, and the Communist Party is steadily losing ground. In Oslo, in the eighties, the Radical Liberal Party has been fluctuating by nearly 3,000 votes, the Socialist-Left Party by more than 2,500, and the Communist Party has been nearly halved. *R* has fluctuated by less than 750 votes! The three parties are fluctuating at the same pace, and gains made by one (or two) parties are almost entirely obviated by losses suffered by the other parties.

Most Stable

In the eighties, *R* is the most stable group in Norwegian elections. More stable than the total electorate of the country! Other electorate groups are not as stable—for example, the nonsocialists as opposed to the socialists, the middle parties, the Conservative Party and the Progressive Party, the Liberal Party plus the Liberal People's Party, the Labor Party plus the Socialist-Left Party. Nothing like this occurred prior to 1945.

Why? Here, we shall shift from facts to conjectures. I make daring guesses. Election researchers may discard them if they want to.

Two Causes

I believe in two causes. In the short run, a large nucleus voted for the same three parties. Whereas the Red vote in Finnmark fluctuated by 141 from 1983 to 1987, it is my guess that overall *R* remained constant.

However, over the decades, something else must have been at work. I believe that a Red electorate arose in 1945, attached to the Communist Party. It has kept renewing itself, attracting new members where older ones have died (or, for example, have shifted to the Labor Party). Red voters joined new parties when the Communist Party collapsed: first the Socialist People's

Party, and, as of 1973, the Socialist-Left Party, and the Radical Liberal Party. "The specter of the Communist Party from 1945" looms where the popular vote remains at the same level in Oslo, Hedmark, and Finnmark for decades. It is a question if there is any party loyalty. However, the loyalty to the Red electorate is amazingly strong.

No Precipice

That puts the lid on the myth of "the precipice between the parties of the Left." The hostility between the party heads is strong. The platform of the Workers' Communist Party referred to the Communist Party as lackeys of Russian imperialism. The Workers' Communist Party is a group of CIA agents, the Communist Party answered. The Workers' Communist Party finds that the Socialist-Left Party is a social democratic party, while the Socialist-Left Party finds that the Workers' Communist Party is an extremist party.

The electorate does not take the same view. There is a steady shift of voters from the Communist Party to the Socialist-Left Party and the Radical Liberal Party. Red voters in Oslo readily vote for Ormhoi in parliamentary elections and for Folkvord for the municipal board. They do not find that there is too much difference.

The fact that the figures do not show any tactical voting for the Labor Party is more strange. Polls indicate that many Red voters fluctuate between the Radical Liberal Party, the Socialist-Left Party, and the Labor Party. It therefore was my belief that where the Socialist-Left Party does not have the possibility of obtaining any parliamentary seats, Red voters will be losing ground in parliamentary elections and making gains in municipal elections.

Tactical

But that is not the case: *R* did not decline from 1983 to 1985 in, for example, Ostfold, Vestfold, Agder, North-Trondelag. (The only obvious exceptions were Sogn and Fjordane.) Either less people vote tactically for the Labor Party than we had expected, or their votes are entirely obviated by a contrary trend. On the other hand, the Radical Liberal Party and the Communist Party declined sharply in 1985 and made new gains in 1987! It seems as if voters belonging to the Radical Liberal Party and the Communist Party vote tactically for the Socialist-Left Party in parliamentary elections—which, actually, does not make sense in those municipalities!

The fact that *R* does not increase at all when the Labor Party loses ground is an important point that I mentioned in the debate with Thorbjorn Jagland in the spring. (1973 is the exception.) In the eighties, the Labor Party and the Red electorate have been gaining and losing ground at the same pace! From 1973 to 1981, the Red electorate gained 30,000 votes, the Labor Party

increased by 170,000 votes. From 1985 to 1987, the Labor Party lost 300,000 votes, the support of the Red electorate declined by about 6,000 votes.

Another myth is "the Red seventies." It was not a question of an election. However, the eighties represent the decade with the largest support for the Red electorate since World War II (except for brief spells in 1945 and 1973.)

The Red electorate usually gains ground throughout the country and in several parties at the same time. That happened in 1981. The gains made in 1973, the largest ones since World War II, were the result of the EEC campaign. But what was the reason for the gains made in 1979-81? The wage freeze in 1978? Radicalized youth who got the vote? I do not know of anybody who has been able to come up with a really convincing explanation.

Three Examples

The statistics show that it takes a lot for a Red candidate to increase R. In the course of the last 30 years, there have only been three reliable examples.

The most obvious example is Nordland in 1985: the Kvanmo effect! A strong group of supporters in favor of the reelection of Hanna Kvanmo, 6,000 additional votes! In 1987, there was an election without her. Bang! R dropped to its "normal" level: 12,000. The second example: Finn Gustavsen in Oslo in 1965. In 1969, without Finn, R declined by 10,000. The last example: Ostfold in 1987. The 1,000 extra votes were due to the "Michelet effect": voters in Ostfold who wanted to have him on the municipal board.

Nobody else has taken very many votes from parties outside the Left. Finstad and Folkvord attracted votes for the Radical Liberal Party in Oslo. Ornhoi and Koritzinsky were known candidates for the Socialist-Left Party. However, they did not increase the support for the Red electorate noticeably within their municipalities. Few Red top people are able to compete with Carl I. Hagen for the vast, mobile electorate masses of the eighties. Kvanmo, Michelet—that is all!

Extremely Isolated!

The Red electorate appears to be an extremely stable and extremely isolated group. It is not losing much ground and has difficulty making new gains. (The only major advance occurred in 1973. And it lasted only a short time.) Gains and losses to the Socialist-Left Party and the Radical Liberal Party are usually merely a question of gains made at the cost of other parties. Or the percentage is fluctuating on account of participation in the election, while the figures remain at the same level.

Are we able to make any predictions for the future on this basis? The Red electorate may be making major gains in 1989, as was the case in 1961 and 1981. However, the Socialist-Left Party and the Radical Liberal Party should not believe that the crisis of the Labor Party will automatically bring them gains. There has been no such trend since 1973.

The Socialist-Left Party, the Radical Liberal Party, and the Communist Party may encounter difficulties with radical-populist lists, such as the urban list in Trondheim. It seized votes from the Red electorate, the Labor Party, the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, and the Progressive Party at the same time! Such lists may ruin the hegemony of the Socialist-Left Party and the Radical Liberal Party over the Red electorate and break the pattern, as a result of which I shall be unable to carry on my beautiful statistics. Several groups would like to try it. Whether they will succeed is a different question.

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SWEDEN

Party Leaders Present Programs as Election Campaign Heats Up

Johansson Agreeable to Coalition

36500153 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 22 Jul 88 p 8

[Article by Margit Silberstein: "Center Party Will Take Part in Three-Party Government"]

[Text] "If we get a nonsocialist majority after the elections, the Center Party will take part in a three-party nonsocialist government." The Center Party leader, Olof Johansson, made this promise in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET. Earlier this year Johansson thought differently. Then he said that the fall elections had to be a victory for the Center Party if the party was to enter into a government with the other nonsocialist parties. Johansson's idea was that if the party suffered another setback in the 1988 elections it would be better to remain outside of the government.

But today Johansson sees things differently. The election campaign is aiming at the swing voters, and the issue is the environment. If the Environmental Party enters the Riksdag, which Johansson does not think will happen, there will not be a nonsocialist majority.

Staying in Power

"Then the Social Democrats will stay in power," Johansson says. If the nonsocialists are able to catch the swing voters and the Environmental Party is kept out of the Riksdag, there will still be the alternative of a three-party government.

"There can be no nonsocialist majority without the Center Party. And if a three-party government is to be formed, it must have a good environmental policy. But we do not have to demand mathematical equality."

"The position of the Center Party in the political strategy is important. A change in governments often depends upon the effort to obtain the swing voters in the middle. This was true in the campaign that led to the change of governments in 1976."

Settling Differences Comes First

Johansson is convinced that the Center Party continues to be the very incarnation of the environmental struggle in the eyes of the voters. At the same time the Center Party leader says that he is thinking of entering into a three-party government, he stresses the need for the three parties to settle their differences. Nuclear power, for example.

The Center Party would rather dismantle it right away. The Liberal Party would rather leave the matter to market forces, and the Moderates want to wait until the plants are used up. But Johansson has a strategy. "It is as clear as day."

"We see that our proposal for an immediate closing is not feasible since a majority in the Riksdag voted for the Social Democratic proposal for a closing in the middle of the 1990's. We will accept and work for that instead. The Center Party has presented a renewal plan for energy and an ambitious economic program. Today there is no market for renewable energy sources in Sweden. Not even Carl Bildt can have anything against our efforts to save energy."

Superfluous Nuclear Power

SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "But don't the Moderates want to wait as long as possible before closing the nuclear plants?"

Johansson: "If we get new sources of energy, nuclear power will become superfluous."

Johansson says that two things have happened since the old three-party government took up the matter of nuclear energy. The first is the referendum and the second is the Social Democratic change in position toward the Center Party. This produced a majority in the Riksdag for closing. Johansson does not want to answer the question of whether the Center Party would stay in a nonsocialist government if the party voted with the Social Democrats.

Johansson has been called the charming farmer from Smaland. Perhaps mainly during the time when he had sideburns, was the energy minister in Thorbjorn Falldin's government in 1976, and stood out as a radical young and angry man. He does not seem as angry now,

but he stood on the Riksdag's podium and matched the Communist Left Party both in commitment and vocabulary when he wanted to stop the uproar about fusion.

"I have strong feelings," the Center Party leader says. He likes to shut his eyes when he talks and thinks and to stop in the middle of an idea so that one does not know whether he has forgotten that he is talking to someone. "When I am attacked, I hit back. But I have a long fuse. I don't really strike back until it is lit. And I don't take back anything I said when I was energy minister. My position against nuclear energy is just as strong today... Everything we warned about has now been confirmed."

He does not think that the role of party leader has changed his life to any great extent. "I have a good relationship with myself," as he expresses it. And this has made it easy for him to meet so-called ordinary people.

"But it is hard to realize that I am sitting in the same place as Gunnar Hedlund and Thorbjorn Falldin."

Learned From Life

He is glad he has been able to be in the Riksdag at the same time as Hedlund, Falldin, Gunnar Strang, and others who have learned from life and not just from books. He agrees that he himself and his contemporaries have been molded in the same form. He says this has to do with society and education.

"Not much to do about it."

If Johansson had not become a politician he would, so to speak, have been sitting on the other side today. His dream was to become a journalist some day, or possibly a teacher. He likes to tell about when he was a young copy editor for the VASTERVIKSDEMOKRATEN and, as he puts it, built up the news. As a sports journalist he liked to put in a few lines about his own team.

"But I never wrote about my own efforts. That was an ethical rule I had."

Today this is not a problem, for now there are others who write about Johansson.

Werner Cites Scandal, Taxes
36500153 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 23 Jul 88 p 7

[Article by Monica Bjorklund: "Demand for Extraordinary Riksdag Session"]

[Text] "If the Standing Committee on Constitutional Reforms is finished with its investigation of the Ebbe Carlsson affair before the elections, an extraordinary Riksdag session should be called." The leader of the Communist Left Party, Lars Werner, said this before his speech yesterday in Almedalen in Visby.

"If the committee has a report ready, it will not be reasonable to let it wait through the elections for a new Riksdag."

He also thinks that Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson is playing down parts of the Ebbe Carlsson affair.

"It was not right for Ingvar Carlsson immediately to promise Anna-Greta Leijon a new ministerial post after the elections. He should have held up such an announcement until the Constitution Committee's investigation was complete."

New Taxes

Lars Werner stressed that it was good that there will now be a complete investigation in the Constitution Committee.

"New information is appearing every day that makes an investigation necessary. But there must not be any political publicity stunts until there is a thorough investigation."

The Communist Left Party leader thinks questions of justice will form the center of the campaign debate. He attacked the economic policy of the Social Democrats.

"It has produced many millionaires and many poor people. It has created a polarization. The policy has been good for Sweden but not for all workers and ordinary people."

Werner would not give a clear answer to the question of whether he would welcome the Environmental Party into the Riksdag.

"The Environmental Party will have to say whether it is a rightist or a leftist party. I think it will be forced to show its colors before the elections."

Antinuclear Policy

Werner pointed out that the Communist Left Party raised environmental questions very early and that it was the first antinuclear party.

"The environmental issue is pressing. It is the most important issue for survival after the problem of peace. We will certainly continue to raise the environmental questions even more strongly."

Werner calls the Social Democratic environmental program much too weak.

In his speech later in the evening the Communist Left leader returned to the Ebbe Carlsson affair, which he called "a real scandal."

It is incomprehensible that Anna-Greta Leijon could meddle into the murder investigation by letting in the book publisher, Carlsson, as a private investigatory leader sponsored by the financier, Tomas Fischer.

"The many strange things that have happened recently show the need for a much improved democratic public control in Sapo."

After having criticized the government's economic policy, Werner also attacked the nonsocialist parties. He does not believe they will be able to cooperate in a government.

The Moderate leader, Carl Bildt, said that, "It is too early to talk about an extraordinary meeting of the Riksdag. It will be difficult to get a complete picture of this affair before the two justice commissions are finished. But it is the Constitutional Committee's task to try if they see that they can be ready."

Bildt thinks the most important thing is for the affair to be investigated carefully. "An extraordinary session of the Riksdag is a gigantic operation, and the probability that all these investigations will be finished before the Riksdag meets in October is not great in my opinion," Bildt said.

"But if it turns out that something comes out quickly that is so sensational that an extraordinary session of the Riksdag should be called, then one should try to do it. But up to now we still don't have all the facts on the table in enough detail," Bildt said.

An extraordinary session of the Riksdag, that is, a meeting while the Riksdag is normally idle—as the Communist Left leader, Lars Werner, demanded on Friday—can be called if the government, the speaker, or a minimum of 115 Riksdag members demand it.

An extraordinary session of the Riksdag was last held in August 1980. Then the Riksdag members were called to take a position on the government's proposal to increase the value added tax and taxes on alcohol, tobacco, gasoline, diesel oil, and chocolate.

Liberals Stress Social Issues

36500153 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 23 Jul 88 p 8

[Article by Peter Starnert: "Liberal Party Supports 'Forgotten Sweden'"]

[Text] The mentally ill, drug abusers, victims of crimes, retarded, chronically ill, handicapped, and relatives of these groups are stressed in a report that the Liberal Party has put together.

"The Liberal Party will place those who have been shoved aside highest on its agenda, according to the party leader, Bengt Westerberg, and Professor Barbro Westerholm, who wrote the report, "Justice For The Forgotten Sweden."

Child maintenance payments to parents with handicapped children should be raised by about 25 percent, the Liberal Party suggests. The parents should also be able to get the same pay as a nursing assistant if the care amounts to a full-time job. Relief in the home is suggested as a cost-free service.

Insufficient Support

"For many families the support from the state and the community is insufficient," Bengt Westerberg and Babro Westerholm say. They do not go into detail about whether higher taxes will be the means to finance the proposed activities.

"The Liberal Party wants the Riksdag, the Landsting, and the communities to take the economic responsibility to see that this program can be carried out. But this means that we must let other urgent and popular projects take a back seat," the authors of the report write, without specifying which projects are meant.

As for the adult handicapped, the Liberal Party proposes that more of them be offered work instead of early retirement, a procedure that can be paid by transferring money from the social insurance sector to the labor market sector.

Skilled nursing care personnel, freedom of choice, and continuity are the key words in the Liberal Party report's proposals for improvements for persons suffering from "the gray illnesses," for example, rheumatism and diabetes.

The significance of suitable housing is stressed for the demented and retarded. If care is to continue over an extended period, persons must have their own rooms.

Paper Views Nonsocialist Alternative
36500153 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
26 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial: "What Do the Nonsocialists Offer?"]

[Text] A public meeting with Carl Bildt, Bengt Westerberg, Olof Johansson in Visby on Thursday. Welcome Moderates, Liberal Party, and Center Party!

The brief press invitation that came Monday was symbolic. When the nonsocialists took over the power of government in 1976 the three party leaders were not ready until the last moment of the campaign to have a picture taken of them together. In 1988 the campaign is being started with a joint campaign meeting.

The invitation strengthened the impression of the past political week. The Center Party leader, Olof Johansson, was astonishingly clear about his party's position during his visit to Gotland. The party is working to achieve a nonsocialist majority in the Riksdag and to form a majority government of the Center, Liberal, and Moderate Parties. The demands that seemed to be Center Party conditions for a cooperative government are now presented by Johansson as conditions for success in the elections.

Johansson said that the three parties must find clear lines of action as early as during the governmental negotiations in all the main questions that otherwise could harm or even paralyze the government. Taxes and energy policy—both issues that have felled nonsocialist governments in the past—naturally belong here. No objection can be found to this working arrangement. On the contrary, it is praiseworthy and even necessary in the light of previous experience. But it must be based on a real will to take responsibility, not be used as a reason to run away.

The Liberal Party leader, Bengt Westerberg, in his speech at Marstrand and in an article in the magazine, AFFARSVARLDEN, made an effort to show the important changes a nonsocialist government could rapidly bring about. The hundred days program sketched by the Liberal Party leader includes the removal of hindrances to private alternatives in social services (for example, the Dwarf Law), the introduction of nursing allowances, removal of the wage earner funds, repeal of the law against collective affiliation, sale of government operations, lower marginal income taxes, new forms of household savings, encouragement of small businesses, greater legal protection with at least one legal consultant in the government, and increased damages for those who have been wronged by improper government action, among other things.

The Moderate Coalition Party leader, Carl Bildt, spoke in Grisslehamn along the same lines. An important contribution to a coming governmental cooperation, he said, would be to treat the environmental policy with a new seriousness and a more genuine enthusiasm. Environmental taxes, which the Moderates have felt dubious about, are now included in what Bildt demands to reduce pollution and to stimulate the introduction of new technology. When the Moderates becomes less of a brake on environmental policy, conditions are improved, particularly for the Center Party, to enter a three-party government with conviction.

The nonsocialist opposition now stands before the elections relatively strong in two ways.

First, they can give the voters reason to change governments. The protection of legal rights and of a constitutional state are enough reason in themselves for a power shift in the fall. The law-stretching, one-time tax on pensions must not be forgotten. The Ebbe Carlsson affair

continually comes up. When former Cabinet Minister and now Ambassador Lidbom actively and as a matter of principle defends those in power who take the laws lightly, he expresses opinions that not only make him unsuitable as a Sapo representative, he also reveals the attitude of a certain Social Democratic inner circle that the voters understandably react against.

Second, the opposition has important proposals that the three parties most probably would be able to put through quickly from a governmental position.

The uncertainty one still feels about the nonsocialist government alternative concerns something else. Is there an inner durability and an outer strength?

The inner part of this uncertainty concerns the sum of all the proposals and aims. We certainly believe that the three parties should be able to arrange a tax compromise with lower marginal taxes, inflation protection of tax rates, increased food subsidies, and higher contributions to the communities. But do they also have a program for the savings necessary to keep the budget deficit from starting to rise again and to prevent the economic balance from being put at risk? The Center and Moderate parties have shown tendencies to succumb to an economic carelessness that may be all right in the opposition but that will not work in the government.

The external uncertainty concerns the ability to hold steady when the wind blows. Even if they avoid legal scandals, the nonsocialist parties must not imagine for a moment that they will avoid attacks, struggles, and biting winds in the government. Will they manage, even in such political waters, to hold fast to the decisions that long-range responsibility calls for? This spring's efforts concerning special survival pensions are not convincing.

Center Party's 'Dilemma'

36500153 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
27 Jul 88 p 2

[Commentary by Annika Jonsson: "Center Party's Non-socialist Dilemma"]

[Text] Sundsvall—Few of the cross-country orientation runners who find their way in Sundsvall's forests are paid. But alertly the Center Party leader, Olof Johansson, made a campaign promise to the sport movement when he took part in the party week that fell together with the cross-country races.

The Center Party wants to remove the social taxes for the professional sportsman. The taxes will be replaced with private, obligatory insurance.

"The necessity to pay social taxes has been a hard blow to the sport movement's economy," Johansson said. Obviously the thought is that the insurance premiums will be cheaper.

The sport movement will surely receive this notice with thanks. The social taxes make up a considerable part of every business's, or organization's, wage costs. Johansson thinks that special treatment of the sport movement is justified by its position as a people's movement.

But there are other people's movements. Is the Center Party aiming in the long run even at stopping payment of social taxes for its own ombudsmen? There is really no reason to liberate the sport movement alone, no matter how deserving it may be, from the obligation to pay social taxes.

Johansson devoted the main part of his speech to the environmental issue. As is known, the Center Party wants to use taxes to force the businesses to clean their refuse of chlorine and sulphur. Environmental taxes on fertilizers is meant to reduce over-fertilizing.

Previously, Johansson declared that a condition for Center's cooperation in a nonsocialist government was the agreement of the other parties to the Center Party's environmental program. But whoever wants to understand the conditions for governmental cooperation better must study the special Kremlinology that journalists on Johansson's trail are forced to understand. Because in spite of the fact that Johansson received praise in the seminar in rhetoric that was arranged in connection with his appearance, he is sometimes almost impossible to understand.

Referring to environmental policy, Johansson says: "My opinion is that if this is not clarified there will be no nonsocialist government."

An environmental policy dictated by the Center Party seems therefore, possibly, to be a condition for Center's cooperation in a nonsocialist government and is in any case, according to Johansson, a condition for the opposition being able to win the election.

But at the same time he sees no need for a common environmental program to be presented before the elections. The parties have "not dedicated themselves so far" to any discussions on the subject. Suddenly it is enough for Johansson to have vague "clarifications" from the Moderate and Liberal parties, which are said to have the right "insight."

The question is whether the Center Party is particularly eager to agree with the other nonsocialist parties on environmental policy. The voters who share Johansson's idea that Center's environmental policy is superior to that of the other parties will no longer have reason—after an agreement—to vote precisely for the Center Party. A vote for the Liberal Party or for the Moderates will produce the same environmental policy. Johansson shares his dilemma with Westerberg and Bildt. It is difficult to present a defensible nonsocialist government alternative without losing one's own profile.

DENMARK

Former Defense Minister: Army on Verge of Credibility Loss
36130086 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 7 Aug 88 p 2

[Article by Sv. Aa Jensen: "Engell: Army About To Lose Its Credibility"]

[Text] The former defense minister said that Denmark cannot continue to be known by its NATO partners as a weak force. The Armed Forces want to keep from talking about this and so does Radical Liberal Jorgen Estrup, but its future is about to be undermined.

The Danish Army will entirely lose its credibility, unless in the upcoming years more conscripts are called up than is being done presently. The Army should be expanded by 2,000 more conscripts. Only 23 percent of all young men are being called up now, and this is a catastrophically low figure.

This was stated by former Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) at a conference in Skodsborg, north of Copenhagen, yesterday. He said that this ought to be one of the main issues addressed in a future defense agreement. "The alternative," he said, "is that the current mobilization strength of 72,000 would be reduced by from 2,000 to 4,000."

Denmark certainly cannot afford to be seen by our NATO partners as reducing forces at the same time as we are committed to receive 13,000 young English soldiers as reinforcements coming to the defense of Denmark. This, at the same time as we are calling up not even a fourth of our own young men as soldiers.

Engell is convinced that the new Defense Commission's thinking will confirm the need for more conscripts. "Trends over the last 6 weeks show that 78.7 percent of the young men have not served as conscripts," and Engell thinks that Denmark is facing a situation "in which a catastrophically small portion of the population will have the necessary qualifications for contributing to the country's defense."

Lt Col Ole Kandberg of the Armed Forces Command Staff believes that people in the Armed Forces now want to be silent on this issue "while the court is sitting," and he says of Engell's statements:

"It has been decided on the political level that the future of the Armed Forces will be determined in a defense commission, and the Parliament has asked the government to come up with its proposals. Therefore, this is not the time to comment on those proposals which have been submitted. However, it is correct that the Armed Forces in the draft it has produced has proposed the calling up of more conscripts in order to uphold quality in the mobilization force in the Army."

Also the Radical Liberal Party's member on the Folketing Defense Committee, Jorgen Estrup, seems to think that it is best to remain quiet while the Defense Commission is at work, and aimed this broadside at Engell: "I think that Hans Engell, just as we others, should respect the fact that we have now started a thorough effort concerning defense."

"He tossed out a mass of figures, but in my opinion, it is not decisive whether a larger or smaller percentage of young people are called up to active military service, but instead whether the Armed Forces is capable of handling its missions in a reasonable manner."

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Projected Revisions in Naval Doctrine, Structure Reviewed

36200203 Herford MARINEFORUM in German
Jul/Aug 88 pp 237-242

[Article by Capt Hans Luessow: "Navy '88: A Current Status Report"]

[Text] Operational developments in the northern flank area (NFR) are based on the following—not new—facts:

The North Sea and the Sea of Norway are the termination areas of the Atlantic sea routes. They also link Great Britain with central Europe. This means that control of the North Sea and the Sea of Norway is just as decisive for the defense of central Europe as control of the Atlantic. And in addition, a successful defense in the Baltic Sea is a decisive condition for control of the North Sea and the Sea of Norway. Thus, defense at sea, on land and in the air in the northern flank area and in central Europe are closely linked and mutually interdependent. In defending the northern flanks the entrances to the Baltic Sea, northern Norway and Iceland constitute key positions. All three must be viewed as keys to supremacy in this strategic triangle.

Loss of the key positions from an air, sea or land attack would be catastrophic for NATO's defense efforts; equally compelling for the Warsaw Pact (WP) is the necessity to occupy these areas to mount an operational attack. This may have been one of the reasons for Gorbachev's suggestions in Murmansk. I will take this point up later.

Early on the German Navy recognized these dangers and against the background of these strategic relationships developed the conceptual basis for an alliancewide approach.

This includes:

1. The decision by the Federal Security Council (BSR) to abolish 61°N as the boundary of the area of operations.

Abolishing this self-imposed limitation established the political conditions for operations by our Navy in the northern flank area.

2. The concept of a strategic position at sea jointly accepted by the three NATO commanders in chief, the TRI-MNC-Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). This features the following principles:

- a) Blocking the enemy as soon as possible by exploiting his unfavorable strategic position at sea and not permitting him to deploy (containment).
- b) Conducting combat in depth in the waters wherever the enemy is encountered (defense in depth).
- c) Gaining or keeping the initiative as soon as possible in order to be able to discourage the attacker, to deny him any fast initial success and to put an early end to the conflict with maximum limitation of damage (keeping the initiative).

CONMAROPS is thus establishing the operational base for operations by our Navy in the northern flank area.

3. The "TRI-MNC North Sea Agreement" which seeks to make possible suitable crossboundary conduct of operations. A Command and Control Agreement was urgently necessary because all three MNC's operate in these waters. The "TRI-MNC North Sea Agreement" thus provides the organizational conditions for operations by the German Navy in the northern flank area.

The three documents—the BSR decision on 61°N, CONMAROPS and the "TRI-MNC North Sea Agreement"—are therefore the political, operational and organizational bases for employing the North Sea component of the German Navy.

If the alliance gives adequate consideration to the geographical, strategic and operational relationships described, the balance of forces in the NFR can be changed in our favor only through timely reinforcements from outside.

But there must also be improvement by making optimal use of the very modest "in-place forces."

This means utilizing flexible and coordinated operations which are not restricted by command boundaries.

Thus, coordinating crossboundary operations in CINC-NORTH and CINCEASTLANT's sphere of responsibility is especially important for naval warfare in the NFR. For that reason there is a basic requirement that the NATO commanders involved agree on coordinated plans. The intended use of naval forces in so-called crossboundary operations at the start of a conflict must therefore be clearly defined by coordination between the NATO commanders and the countries. At the present time we are making good progress in this process.

Parallel with this development are efforts to steer the complicated command relationships in the North Sea toward a solution involving pragmatic methods, through coordination between the air defense commanders and through appropriate exercises.

From this situation you will note that the sector boundaries in the North Sea, which in the past were in part very problematic and politically sensitive, have therefore declined in importance and that continuous conduct of operations is guaranteed independent of the sector.

Assignment to SACLANT?

This brings me to the discussion which repeatedly resurfaces concerning possible assignment of our North Sea component to the commander in chief, Atlantic (SACLANT), as was recently demanded again in an article on "Troop Practice."

The following reasons are decisive for the fundamental decision not to pursue these efforts:

1. The Navy's area of operations is the northern flank area in which the Baltic Sea, the entrances to the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Sea of Norway and adjoining bodies of water constitute a strategic unit.
2. The German Navy is mandated to protect NATO territory and to guarantee reinforcement and supply traffic for Europe. Thus, it is employed within the framework of its mission, appropriate to German security interests and directly related to forward defense in central Europe.
3. Apart from the principle that all forces which are stationed in the sector of a NATO commander in chief should be assigned to him, it appears only reasonable, given the previously mentioned assumptions, for all German naval forces not to give up their close association with the Army and Air Force.
4. The areas of operations and the threat require cross-boundary use of the naval forces and naval aviation. The TRI-MNC North Sea Agreement established the conditions for this so that no change in assignment is necessary.
5. In the event the view is put forward that the Navy would better be off in the hands of the maritime commander in chief, Atlantic, we must keep in mind
 - a) that the Mediterranean also is part of the European command area, and
 - b) that our opportunities to have influence as the strongest northern European navy are better here than under the predominance of the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic so that as maritime concerns are understood at the headquarters of the commander in

chief, Europe, the issue is more a matter of filling suitable billets with qualified German naval officers and in that way gain influence.

The Murmansk Initiative

I briefly mentioned the Murmansk initiative expressed by CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev. Admiral Meisner reported on it in MARINEFORUM ½, 1988.

Gorbachev's recommendations:

- limiting maneuvers, restricting antisubmarine operation, avoiding shipping lanes, fishing regions and straits in the northern flank area;
- offering to withdraw Soviet submarines with nuclear weapons from the Baltic Sea;
- a zone in northern Europe free of nuclear weapons;
- bringing maneuver observers on board ship.

These recommendations were repeated by official agencies at the beginning of the year and were set forth by Gorbachev in like manner for the Mediterranean.

In my opinion the old familiar model is being followed:

- depicting U.S. and NATO strategy as aggressive;
- diverting attention from their own disproportionate and aggressive naval arms and shipping policy;
- engineering opposition between the dominant position of the United States and other NATO countries;
- creating opposition between the governments "that listen to the United States" and the people who want peace;
- introducing regional detente initiatives;
- using the neutral Scandinavian countries to gain influence over the NATO Scandinavian countries;
- forcing the West on the defensive politically.

The USSR scarcely refers to its own efforts in this initiative. There is only one marginal reference to the Barents Sea. Withdrawing G-submarines from the Baltic Sea is not a significant concession. Ultimately the disadvantages are on the side of NATO whose maritime dependence particularly along the northern flank was correctly analyzed.

The objective of the recommendations is:

- to create a protected area around Soviet naval bases in order to regain operational freedom;

- to prevent opportunities for NATO navies to practice the CONMAROPS principles;
- to unsettle the NATO solidarity of Iceland, Norway and Denmark;
- to limit the NATO navies' reaction capability in a crisis;
- to alter the status of the Baltic Sea, straits and the key positions of offshore sea areas in such a way that the law of the seas is negatively impacted and the NATO navies' freedom of movement is restricted;
- to guarantee the USSR the position of dominance—as a guarantor power—and to manifest its conventional superiority in the NFR;
- to involve naval forces in the CSCE process—at least in a regionally limited way.

The West must protest the latter with absolute determination. The attempt to restrict independent naval activities or to be obligated to give notification contradicts the basic principle that CSCE measures must not endanger the security of a country nor should another side derive advantages from that.

Because of the geostrategic disparities—let me mention only NATO's dependence on seaward reinforcements—such a step is totally unacceptable to us as long as the WP forces in Europe are not drastically reduced. Please do not misunderstand me. All efforts to decrease the danger of war in Europe must be supported. These include broadened confidence-building measures as well as negotiations on reducing conventional forces in order to achieve stability in Europe.

But:

- Independent naval activities are not part of CSCE.
- Naval forces and naval aviation are not a topic for negotiation for conventional stability.

Avoiding Incidents

Independent of this unambiguous position and clearly separate from all multinational CSCE/CDE [Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe] measures, among others, it is our assessment that following the example of the Americans and British, who in 1972 and 1986, respectively, concluded with the USSR bilateral "Agreements to Avoid Incidents On and Above the High Seas," it would be helpful to reach similar agreements. That would permit controlling the course of events after an incident on the high seas in a straightforward manner and at the lowest possible political level. Arrangements to prevent incidents would also be in the forefront.

The bases to date for the interactive behavior of naval forces on the high seas are the regulations of international law, namely the Agreement on International Controls to Prevent Collisions at Sea. But these provide only partial protection for specific concerns of naval forces and naval aviation when involved in exercises.

The purpose of such an agreement would have to reside primarily, if not completely, in the political sector:

- In the event of incidents it is possible to have recourse to the control group which is provided for in the agreement.
- The agreement leads to regular dialogue contacts between governments concerning maritime questions; the command staffs could be included among the contacts.
- Such contacts have political significance as a substitute for official discussions.
- In peacetime the importance of the Navy and its political dimension are underscored.

Such an agreement would contribute to reducing tensions and/or preventing their occurrence from the outset. Overall we would be dealing with a contribution to normalize relations.

Territorial Waters a Problem Area

Territorial waters pose another problem area in respect to maritime law.

In 1985 the FRG extended its territorial waters in the so-called Helgoland box by more than 3 nautical miles to 16 nautical miles. After the Netherlands extended their territorial waters in the same year to a total of 12 nautical miles, the drawing of borders, an issue of controversy throughout history, in the area of the mouth of the Ems River once again became acrimonious.

We view efforts to extend German territorial waters in the area between the Ems and the Elbe for the purpose of improving the German negotiation position vis-a-vis the Netherlands as a matter of great concern.

Further extension of German territorial waters—even if confined to the North Sea—could have the negative effect of a precedent in respect to maritime law. In the Baltic Sea the possibility that Denmark for the first time and the GDR again might be in a position to view FRG expansion of its territorial waters as cause for expanding their own territorial waters cannot be ruled out:

- a) The GDR could give up its existing conservative expansion practice and in the area of the Luebeck Bay and the Kadet Channel expand its territorial waters to the midline. This would bring the GDR in line with the "Mare Clausum Doctrine" which was proclaimed by the

Soviet Union and the entire Warsaw Pact; whether the USSR would at the present time allow the GDR such a far-reaching and momentous measure appears uncertain.

b) By extending its territorial waters Denmark could place the passages in the areas of Bornholmsgat, Kattegat and the southern outlet of the Small Belt under Danish sovereignty. Then regions which the German Navy uses for artillery and torpedo firing and submarine diving would be partially in Danish territorial waters. Naval air traffic would be restricted because of the overflight rights.

In view of the growing trend in the Danish parliament to advocate national interests in alliance policies unconditional support for German training activities in Danish territorial waters cannot be expected on a long-term basis. Because of the Gulf crisis the employment of naval units outside the NATO treaty region has been intensively and extensively discussed by the German public and in part is also the subject of legal and political investigations.

During the last discussion by the DMI in Flammersheim (see also the article "Out of Area" in MARINEFORUM 6, 1988) a blue ribbon group of jurists also addressed this topic. In the process it became evident to me that in the juridical discussion the view that using naval forces under certain conditions outside NATO territory conforms with international law and the constitution has been receiving increased attention. Thus, it is primarily a political decision.

The FRG, in adhering to its political line, decided not to dispatch any German warships to the crisis region. But early on there were indications of its being open to compensatory activities. Thus it decided to dispatch naval units to the Mediterranean in order to fill gaps in the operational readiness level in these important waters; these gaps were caused by the withdrawal of our allies' ships when they were dispatched to the Gulf. In September of last year a German minesweeper tender in the Standing Naval Force Channel while it was deployed in the Mediterranean replaced the Belgian tender Zinnia which had been withdrawn for a short time for service in the Gulf. In October 1987, following consultations with our allies, the minister of defense then announced the federal government's decision to send an operational group consisting of a destroyer, a frigate and a resupply ship to the Mediterranean for the period 15 October to 18 December. This group participated in the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) and following that, under the command of the NATO naval commander, South (COMNAVSOUTH), undertook training and practice exercises. From 21 January to 15 March 1988, a unit consisting of a destroyer, three frigates and a resupply ship went to the Mediterranean on a training cruise which also involved missile firing.

Immediately following, from 16 March to 15 June, two frigates and a resupply ships which are participating in

the NAVOCFORMED and the Dragon Hammer maneuvers remained in service. Further use in the Mediterranean is likewise planned for the second half of 1988; decisions must still be made as to scope and duration.

Experiences in the Mediterranean

Now, after more than one-half year of compensatory operations in the Mediterranean our experiences can be summarized as follows:

1. First, it must be stated that these are not the first operations by naval units in the Mediterranean. Since the Navy has been in existence our ships have regularly been in the Mediterranean for training exercises. Please recall the missile firing at the CEM [Mediterranean Test Center], participation in maneuvers, training ship cruises and the firing of combat missiles and torpedoes in Greece's territorial waters.

2. From the point of view of military policy such employment was rated as highly successful. In many comments it became evident that our allies correctly understood the signal and acknowledge the German Government's readiness to be involved in "burden sharing." Bilateral contacts and the Military Committee make this clear. Of course, there were also voices which considered such a "strong appearance" of German forces as too significant.

3. In terms of domestic policy the discussion contributed to making clear to the public the opportunities and importance of maritime policy.

4. Within the Navy the mission represented a special challenge. One week after the political decision the units, to which this operation came as a total surprise, sailed fully equipped and operations-ready. All preparations went completely smoothly and totally as a matter of course. This is proof of the professionalism, know-how and motivation of all those involved.

5. Of course, we must still examine how, with a protracted engagement in the Mediterranean, to be able to appropriately consider and balance the special burden on the soldiers and their families, in view of the overall social concern of reducing working time and striving to be able to plan leisure time.

6. Because of the particularly favorable weather conditions in the Mediterranean and the diverse opportunities for training with other navies the success of training for our units is assessed as high. No doubt the other navies in the Mediterranean have the same opinion because there is substantial interest in training jointly with our units.

7. There were no problems in respect to sailors, technical matters and navigation. This is not in the least unusual since our units—as previously mentioned—have experience in these waters.

Arms Planning: Navy Not Unaffected

Now I will turn to somewhat more tangible things, namely arms planning. As you have learned from the press, the minister agrees with the Navy's planning recommendations for the next few years. Also considered was the fact that significant cuts became necessary for the Army and Air Force and the Navy appeared to be unaffected. This impression is incorrect. Because of the diminishing cost structure and cost increases in connection with the pressure to replace personnel-intensive—let me mention the catchword demographic development here—obsolete weapon systems and because of rising maintenance costs for obsolescent units, the chief of staff, Navy, was compelled to initiate decisive intervention in the preliminaries to the planning conference.

Among other things, this includes:

- dispensing with class 211 submarines which were optimized for the North Sea;
- reducing the number of new submarines optimized for the Baltic Sea by the year 2000;
- reducing the available antisubmarine vehicles;
- reducing new naval long-range reconnaissance/antisubmarine aircraft;
- significant reduction in new minesweeping vehicles;
- substantial postponement in delivering new helicopters as well as drastic cuts in the so-called small projects, which, however, actually assure fleet viability.

In spite of that, the following are still possible:

- delivery of four class 123 frigates effective 1994;
- delivery of new class 212 submarines effective 1995;
- delivery of new MPA's effective 1997;
- replacement of the tenders—even if in reduced number;
- delivery of new naval helicopters effective 1998.

Nonetheless, with the procurement planning possible at present and with the design of the planned weapon systems we are operationally at the minimum level which can still be justified. From now on a priority goal of planning is to counteract the increasing obsolescence of the fleet by new standards with growth potential in the sensor and weapons sector and to maintain a fleet whose components are balanced—as measured against the mission.

Measures in the Organizational Sector

I would like to mention several important measures in the organizational sector:

For years there has been discussion of the problem area centering on the "status of the commander of the North Sea naval forces (BSN)."

Last year the chief of staff decided that, given the conditions of the now fully operational command system in Gluecksburg, operational command even for destroyers/frigates, MPA's and the BSN units which are on foreign cruises will be transferred to the commander of the fleet.

The new task of "typecrossing examination of operational training" will be transferred to the BSN. In addition, the naval tactical training detachment will be assigned to him. This will be done first in an operational test on 1 July 1988. With the simultaneous retention of two NATO naval commanders, this arrangement, which is restricted only to the assignment of national missions, will strengthen the uniform command with a modern system, clarify the position of the fleet's commander and standardize operational training in the Navy.

Effective the fourth quarter of 1988 the submarine training detachment will be moved from Neustadt to Eckernfoerde. Tactical operational training and security-technical training will be combined there in the AZU (submarine training center). This will assure better usefulness of the costly simulation facilities by the units for proficiency training.

With the increasing importance of reservists we need to remedy some training deficiencies in sectors which were badly neglected and raise the level of the reservists' motivation. One such sector is the training of reservists who are to be employed in mobilization units, for example merchant ships which are required in a crisis situation to support the fleet and provide surveillance of the waters. Thus, effective 1990 a training center will be established in Flensburg at which these reservists are to perform their reserve training on acquired merchant ships.

[Box item: This MARINEFORUM article represents an only slightly shortened version of the lecture given by Capt Hans Luessow on the topic of "News from the Navy," which was presented at the 1988 meeting of the members of the Naval Officer's Association in Bonn on April 23.

The speaker, section head, Joint Forces Staff III 1, is responsible for questions concerning operational employment.]

FINLAND

Increased Reports of Submarine Incursions Off Coast

36500168 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Aug 88 p 6

[Article by Jan Linden: "Submarine Reports Increase in Eastern Uusimaa"]

[Text] (Emsalo) (Special to HUFVUDSTADSBLADET) "Rannikko [Coast]-88," the Coast Guard's large exercise is under way mainly along the southern coast. At the same time, sources state that the number of reports on submarine incursions have been significantly more than usual in the East Uusimaa archipelago. So far, however, no submarine has been found.

Yesterday [Saturday], there was great activity west of Emsalo. A pair of the Navy's boats were operating back and forth along Kalv Island and out to the Emsalo pilot station. Naval divers set out several buoys in the sound between Kalvon [island] and the small Anon [island]. Planes from the Air Force flew several passes over the area. The totally uninformed local population immediately guessed a submarine hunt.

First Lieutenant Matti Kalanti at the Suomenlinna Coast Guard Station rejected the rumors completely: "This has to do with an exercise in connection with the large coastal maneuvers," he briefly stated.

The exercise coincides in a remarkable manner with the reports of submarines which have been observed off Emsalo. At the start of the week, a report came from a fisherman, and on Thursday [18 August], the Coast Guard received information of a submarine periscope having been sighted in the channel. Both reports were investigated, but searches revealed nothing.

Defense Minister Ola Norrback had not been given any reports on new submarine indications. "We have indeed received reports from the area, but that was early in the week," he said. "I haven't heard anything new today. I have requested that I be informed immediately of all reports."

"How many reports are received then, for example, per year?"

"It varies, but all are followed up! With each report a large machine is set in motion. We take this more seriously than people believe."

Minister Norrback did not wish to comment further as to whether so-called submarine indications have been increasing in east Uusimaa. Nor would anyone in the Coast Guard provide more specific information.

There is a great silence surrounding these events. It is known that the Gulf of Finland is a veritable "interstate highway" for submarines, but they did not operate in our shallow waters. Only two or three cases of submarine sightings have been documented, mainly from the Archipelago Sea.

One explanation for the activity which the increases submarine reports indicate might be the ongoing maneuver. But still everything is a matter of speculation and asserted but unconfirmed observations.

Defense Ministry Civil Servant on Armed Forces' Problems

36500/164 Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 7 Aug 88 p 24

[Article by Marit Ingves: "Will Pea Soup and Courage Save Our Armed Forces?"]

[Text] In contrast to many other ministries, the Defense Ministry is not only fighting with the finance minister over appropriations—it must often win public support for increased funding as well.

In recent years our Armed Forces have noted repeatedly that their increases have not followed the latest Defense Committee recommendations. But at the same time studies have shown that defense resolve is very high.

"Yes, that is a paradox. There is no rational explanation for it," said Defense Ministry section chief Aimo Pajunen.

"People seem to take our capability for granted. We managed in World War II. Obviously all that is needed is courage and pea soup and everything will be fine," the section chief said in his fluent and faultless Swedish.

But although he also considers it unfortunate that the Defense Ministry does not get all the funds it wants, he stressed that one cannot say that our defense has been neglected in any way as a result. "The Armed Forces have been able to expand quite a bit anyway. Our defense system also has a good reputation in other countries. The emphasis is now being placed on land forces. The Air Force received more money earlier. But in the 1990's, new combat planes will be needed."

Pajunen did not wish to engage in any speculation about which country the planes would be purchased from.

"Everything is secret here," he said with a twinkle in his eye. "No one knows yet which plane will be selected or where it will come from. The matter is still being studied."

Not That Simple

We shifted from appropriations to arms reduction.

Pajunen mentioned the dialogue between the two big superpowers. He would not talk about actual arms reduction but said he could see the beginning of arms control.

He referred to the agreement on medium-range missiles and the attempt to do something about so-called strategic weapons. These are positive signs.

But he said it is hard to know what effect the new climate will have on a regional level. The section chief was not prepared offhand to subscribe to the so-called sausage theory which says that the nuclear weapons that disappear from central Europe must be compensated for in some way by other weapons in both northern and southern Europe.

"It is not that simple, but at the same time ocean-borne weapons have become more important."

Pajunen also believes that conventional weapons in Europe will be reduced in the long run—both the American and the Soviet presence will diminish.

"The current problems will become easier, but I am afraid new problems will arise," he said.

The section chief said no more about security policy directly. He talked about the growing gap between rich and poor countries, environmental organizations, a possible future energy crisis, the shortage of goods and food that could lead to various conflicts.

What role does defense play in such a world?

"It will not change. There will continue to be disturbing elements. Each nation looks after its own defense. As far as we are concerned the defensive role of the Armed Forces will remain important, in other words it is not a question of waging war but of showing strength and staying out of conflicts as a result."

More Children!

But Pajunen is concerned about other things besides international problems. We Finns are struggling with a very big problem—too few children are being born.

"This is something that could be a major problem for the Armed Forces in the long run. In the 1980's there have been 1,000 fewer recruits per year than there used to be. In the 1950's, 90,000 children were still being born each year. In 1985 we were down to 63,000 children."

But Pajunen does not view this development solely from the perspective of defense. He is thinking of Finland's economic structure and society as a whole.

"We risk having a country where policy is increasingly pursued in terms of retirees. It is hard to know what should be done, but we must do everything we can."

The government official believes that one of the measures that should be adopted is his central idea—that children's votes should also be counted in political elections.

"The position of families with children should be strengthened. A family with three children should have five votes in an election. A family without children should have only two votes, for example," he said.

"I believe social development could be influenced in this way, although it is no ready-made solution," he said of his idea, which he is serious in proposing, although it has fallen on deaf ears when he has presented it on various occasions.

"But if the voices of families with children were heard more clearly in our society, I am convinced that people would have more children."

Everyone Needed

One figure led to another. We started talking about defense again and a discussion that was conducted in connection with the presidential election concerning our ability to mobilize an Army of 700,000, which many people consider much too large.

Could We Get Along With a Smaller Army?

"Finland has a big area compared to its population," he replied. "Additional people are needed for the reserves. We are really talking about an army of half a million men. We have over a million trained men in the reserves. But our wartime army is only half a million strong. And we have already cut back to 250,000 men whom we are now trying to provide with modern training. The rest, those involved in local defense, for example, must make do with older but still useful training. But they are all needed."

As a result of the decline in the number of recruits from year to year, defense, like so many other sectors of society, has been affected by what is known as structural change.

"The fact is that we have an organization that is too big for the number of recruits while at the same time the reserves are growing. Therefore we have already decided to eliminate some units. We will also have to reduce the number of staffs. But we do not yet know which ones and how the cuts will be made."

06578

FRANCE

Agreement With Brazil on Helicopter Sale Signed
351900093c Paris *L'USINE NOUVELLE* in French
30 Jun 88 p 20

[Article by Jean-Pierre Casamayou]

[Text] The Ecureuil and Dauphin helicopters manufactured by the French company have conquered Brazil. This military contract comes just at the right time.

The contract has been signed, at last! For Fr1.4 billion, Brazil is buying 52 helicopters from Aerospatiale: 16 Ecureuils (Esquilo in Brazilian), and 36 Dauphins in the land-forces version. The purchase was in doubt until the last minute because of an appeal filed by the U.S. company, Bell, which considered the choice made in favor of the French manufacturer unfair.

That choice had already been expressed in January, when Brazil put Aerospatiale at the head of its "short list," ahead of the U.S. companies Bell and Sikorsky, the German MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow- Blohm], and the Italian Agusta. It is true that, in this battle, in which it was led by its new head, Jean-Francois Bigay, the helicopters division had a very effective weapon: its Brazilian subsidiary, Helibras. Created 10 years ago, this subsidiary (65 percent of the stock of which is owned by Brazil), employing 300 people, has already assembled over 100 helicopters.

Aerospatiale will now increase to 49 percent its participation in Helibras. For its part, Engesa, the Sao Paulo manufacturer of armored vehicles, will buy the shares held by the state of Minas Gerais. This financial agreement is part of the compensations that usually accompany contracts of this type. In addition to providing a bank loan, France is also expected to buy some 50 Tucano trainers manufactured by Embraer. These trainers are competitors of the new version of Aerospatiale's own Epsilon. But business is business. Yet, in spite of industrial compensations and the obligation to assemble in Brazil part of the helicopters sold, this contract is particularly advantageous.

At a time when civil helicopter sales are collapsing (the activity of the helicopters division of Aerospatiale is down 8 percent, to Fr6.4 billion), the military takes over. After Saudi Arabia purchased outfitted Super-Pumas, Belgium has now ranked the Ecureuil first in its evaluation of combat helicopters. This should rejoice the Marignane factory.

This is also the reaction at Turbomeca, which will supply the turbines. After the Brazilian order, it will manufacture some 100 Arriel engines for the twin-engine Dauphins and for the single-engine Ecureuils: enough to raise the production of the Pau company, which is at a low ebb—it did not even reach 600 engines last year. In addition, the purchase of the Tucanos could turn out to be a good deal for Turbomeca, as it is proposing to replace the U.S.-made engines that equip the trainers with the latest model of its Astazou turbine.

9294

GREECE

Comments on EVO's Leadership Change, Poor Situation

Chairman's Refusal To Resign
35210129 Athens *TA NEA* in Greek 6 Jul 88 p 10

[Text] The Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Greek Arms Industry [EVO], Dr Stamatis Kambanis,

is being removed through extraordinary procedures following his refusal to resign as had been suggested to him by the Ministry of National Defense which oversees the defense industry.

Ministry of Defense sources referred to the change in leadership at the EVO group yesterday saying that it occurred so that new people may provide better coordination and an acceleration of the production of the greatly diffused Greek defense industry (the administration of the Greek aircraft industry EAV has already changed after the resignation of Mr Fotilas). Other sources said that a negative report about Mr Kambanis that had reached high-level government officials contributed to his removal.

A new president for the EVO, civil engineer Nikos Papadakis, was expected to be appointed a little before noon, according to information available. He is the counselor to the alternative minister of National Defense, Stathis Giotas, and was counselor when Mr V. Saranditis and Mr Th. Stathis were deputy ministers of defense.

Artemis-30

The case evolved very swiftly although (according to one estimate) a new parameter was introduced into the change of management issue one month ago when the Ministry of Defense wanted to modify the original contract with the EVO on the delivery terms for Artemis-30. The EVO, which did not want any changes to the contract, reacted negatively to that possibility. Indicative of this "dispute" is an excerpt of a speech delivered by Mr Kambanis yesterday morning, to EVO workers at Mandra: "While the company is moving satisfactorily on the time schedule for the production of Artemis 30," he said, "there appeared some difficulties in the procedures for the delivery of the system, which could lead to delays. And this is not our fault." He continued, "Although the EVO is expecting to be able in the next 3 years, starting with this year, to make a living from the weapons system, it is clear that if the Artemis-30 is abandoned, there will be no income for the company."

He also stressed that if "there is no consistency and continuity" there is danger that the level of high sales (of ammunition) abroad will not be maintained; and that the EVO is the only state company "with a positive balance sheet." He concluded with the sentence: "For this reason, the management and I can personally be proud because we planned and are implementing an honest and effective project which looks to tomorrow with assurance."

Especially for the ARTEMIS, it is said that the ministry is demanding too many tests and setting tough acceptance terms "which, however," the National Defense General Staff (GEETHA) counters, "is the case in the war industries around the world."

Special Meeting

Mr St. Giotas asked for the resignation of Mr Kambanis day before yesterday. Because the president of the EVO refused, the military members of the administrative council called a special meeting at 1600 hours yesterday. According to information, Mr Kambanis stressed during the meeting that in his view there was no reason for him to resign because his work was successful (covering the deficit, liquidity); he said he does not feel any bitterness because he realizes that these appointments are political, but he stressed that a resignation without an explanation would mean that he had not done his job well or, as he stated later, that "there was some flaw."

By a 6 to 3 decision the administrative council this morning decided to call for a special general conference of shareholders (Ministry of Defense, ETVA [Hellenic Industrial Development Board], etc.) to decide on the replacement of Mr Kambanis as member of the administrative council. After this procedure (during which, as was said earlier, Mr N. Papadakis will become a new council member) it is expected that a little before noon the new administrative council would be convened to elect its new president.

Ministry of Defense sources say that until a new unified carrier of the defense industry is legislated (as recommended by the previous deputy minister Mr Th. Stathis) an informal coordinating body will be in operation that will include the new presidents of the EAV and the EVO under the chairmanship of Mr St Giotas. An effort will be made to also have the ELVO [Greek Arms Industry] and the Munitions and Cartridge Company [PYRKAL] (that now belong to the Ministry of Industry). It is also said that coordination is indispensable because the companies work in competitive sectors which sometimes have nothing to do with their mission.

After these developments it is expected that the regular annual general conference of the EVO which had been scheduled for tomorrow, will be postponed until the end of the month.

Minister's Statements

35210129 Athens *I KATHIMERINI* in Greek
15 Jul 88 p 4

[Text] Amazing but sincere was the acknowledgment made by the alternate minister of national defense, Mr Stathis Giotas, yesterday morning during the installation of the new president of the EVO, Mr Nikos Papadakis.

Mr Giotas spoke of "autonomy and self-determination in the defense industries, of clashes and friction among them, of the development of similar production activities and of reversal of roles between the Ministry of National Defense and the defense industries." He described all this, as "unacceptable practices that are obstacles to the government's effort to develop and implement the programs of the defense industries."

Addressing workers in the above mentioned industries, Mr Giotas said among other things that:

- The new president is undertaking the difficult task of swiftly developing and implementing the company's programs. It is a new very important start for the defense and the economy of the country which is spending enormous amounts of money every year to meet its defense needs.
- The new management is assuming the burden of swiftly promoting the implementation of the air defense system "Artemis-30," as well as assuming the obligation to put into operation at the earliest possible time the Kymi unit.
- Until a unified carrier for the defense industries is legislated, (it is expected to be ready this fall) an informal council of the defense industry will be in operation at the Ministry of Defense.
- The new management will study the reports made by the unions of employees and workers on subjects related to the organization of the company, the criteria for the selection of management cadres, and the methods of personnel hiring.

Mr Giotas also admitted that all war industries, and especially the PYRKAL, are facing problems.

The new president, Mr Papadakis, said that efforts of the new management will focus on changing the rate of achieving successive goals, in the way management is conducted, and in production procedures.

The unions of EVO workers in Athens, Aigion, and Lavrion, as well as the workers at the "Geniki Mikhaniki EPE" [General Mechanics], and "Metallourgiki Viomikhania Ipeirov AE" [Ipeiros Metallurgical Industry] referred to their more general problems. The most important of those problems include "the lack of organizational structures that will ensure the correct operation of the company, openness in all sectors, development of labor potential, and career development based on merit."

Other problems include the "hellenization of the procurement, the development of new products, etc."

8193/9604

ITALY

Finance Guard Commissions 6 New Patrol Vessels
35280159b Genoa RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA
in Italian Jun 88 pp 54-56

[Article by Andrea Nativi]

[Text] For the past several years the Finance Guard [GdF] has been carrying out a plan for the modernization and expansion of its naval component—a plan that

involves adapting the assets and organization of its Naval Section to tasks that are increasingly burdensome.

The most important project within the compass of this program is assuredly represented by the construction of a series of large patrol vessels that will in the future represent the fulcrum of the naval detachments of the Finance Guard.

It is useful to retrace briefly the somewhat tormented history of these vessels. As is well known (see RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA, 12/1985), the contract for construction of the first two of these vessels was awarded to the Liguri Naval Shipyards of Riva Trigoso, which was victorious in the bidding advertised by the GdF. Subsequent instances of nonfulfillment of contractual obligations on the part of the shipyard, together with technical deficiencies in the design, led to the cancellation of the contract at a time when the outfitting of the two hulls was already in an advanced stage. To regain at least a part of the time lost, it was therefore decided to give consideration to an already-implemented design that would ensure performance and reliability. The contract—which had become operative in November of last year—was accordingly awarded to Fincantieri [Shipyards Finance Corporation] at the conclusion of direct negotiations. The order concerns the first two of the six vessels projected, which will be delivered by the shipyard in an extraordinarily reduced period of time: the first patrol vessel will be delivered by the end of 1989, or at the latest in January 1990, while the second is projected to follow after an interval of 4 months. The first vessel will accordingly begin the sea tests in September of next year. In order to satisfy the urgent requirements of the Finance Guard, instead of a succession of vessels built to scale there will be parallel construction that is not completely identical.

The plates of the hull were laid down in March, whereas the process of selecting the subcontractors was completed only recently. The vessels will be built at the Muggiano shipyard, near La Spezia.

The projected cost for the first two hulls is limited to 35 billion lire, to which will be added at least another 10 billion for the combat systems and armament, to be supplied directly by the GdF. The weapons systems were in fact ordered in anticipation of their installation on the vessels that were cancelled, and are currently in storage and ready for installation. Although all six vessels have already been programmed and funded, only the first two have been ordered, while the contract provides—in a generic way—the option of constructing an indefinite number of other patrol vessels. In order to avoid dangerous "jumps" in production (which generally speaking do not encourage the containment of costs), it is advisable to develop a complete construction program.

In view of the rather tight time limits for delivery of the vessels, a construction design was preselected that has already been put into practice—a design that has of course been adapted to the requirements and specifications of the GdF.

Basically, the requirements of the Finance Guard have not undergone any changes as regards the specifications announced several years ago, and various designs constructed by Fincantieri—following a limited elaboration—proved to be suitable. The choice fell on the design of the 300-ton Ratcharit-class gunboat, of which three were reproduced for the Thai navy between 1976 and 1979 by the then Breda Naval Shipyard of Marghera.

The Finance Guard does not, of course, need heavily armed FPB's, and—in an effort that lasted only a few months—the design was accordingly revised, especially as regards the combat systems and internal layout, while maintaining the lines of the hull virtually unchanged.

In the plans of the Naval Section of the GdF, these six units will serve as veritable mobile operations centers, coordinating and directing naval units such as coast-guard vessels and helicopters and—it is expected—fixed-wing aircraft. To this end it is particularly important to be able to operate for several days even on the high seas, with the consequent requirements of range, stability at sea, and crew comfort. The "admirals" of the GdF must also carry out research, surveillance, and patrol missions—including in coordination with the analogous services of other countries—thereby consolidating a practice that is now routine. The usual operational theater will be the traditional "hot spots"—the Strait of Sicily, the Strait of Sardinia, and the Strait of Otranto—as well as international waters.

With six vessels available it will be possible to maintain two vessels at sea and another two in operational reserve, while the remaining two are undergoing maintenance work. The new units are designed with a view to maximum facilitation of maintenance, whether at the site of operations or at the mechanical repair facilities that are directly accessible.

Technical Details

The new patrol vessels will have steel hulls, a load displacement of approximately 315 tons, and an overall length of 51 meters. As for the propulsion system, the tendency is toward a 100-percent diesel solution. The two 3,300-horsepower, 12-cylinder BL 230.12 GMT's on two shafts will deliver a top speed of 28 knots (30 every 6 hours), a continuous top speed of 26 knots, and a range of 2,700 miles at a speed of 15 knots. The engines—which are installed in one location—are connected to two fixed-blade propellers by a Lohmann reduction coupling.

In this way one shaft is eliminated by comparison with the "Thai" design, which called for three 13,500-horsepower MTU's in two locations and for a top speed of 36 knots. The tasks assigned to the patrol vessels do not, however, require a particularly high speed capability, whereas it is anticipated that the vessels will remain at sea continuously for as long as 1 week.

The selection of very reliable engines (time between overhauls: 12,000 hours)—engines that have a low rotation speed and are characterized by a not particularly high weight-to-power ratio—therefore seems logical.

The patrol vessels will be equipped with two 176-kilowatt Isotta Fraschini generators, together with a third generator of 32 kilowatts for emergency use.

The hull has a continuous deck with a slight lift and a stern level with the water. The superstructures—which are somewhat restrained in their dimensions—are grouped amidships, with ample open space aft. The subdivision of the locations provides for a bridge with pilothouse and COC. At the level of the upper deck are the rooms for the crew's dayroom activities (mess hall, galley), a small clinic, the commander's quarters, and the TLC station. The quarters for the noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, and some storage areas, are located on the deck immediately below. The particular use prescribed for the patrol vessels has made it essential to seek the maximum comfort for the crew (1 commissioned officer, 10 noncommissioned officers, and 20 enlisted personnel) with an area that is definitely spacious considering the dimensions of the vessels. Livability is also ensured by an air-conditioning system and by the location of the rooms, with the dayroom area located on the upper deck and the quarters installed amidships above the water line to reduce the effect of the rolling and pitching. Moreover, the rooms are separated from the engine complex, thereby reducing the sound pollution, vibration, and induced heat. Last, one should not overlook the fact that the vessel is equipped with two mobile stabilization fins.

The lower deck is reserved mainly for the storerooms, auxiliary machinery, and a large room that can be used either as a storeroom or to accommodate shipwreck victims when necessary.

The combat system of the new patrol vessels was built by Selenia Elsag and is based on a Pegasus "optronic" fire control center controlling a 30/80-mm Breda twin turret. The armament is rounded out by two 7.62-mm machine guns located on the deckhouse aft of the mast. The 30/80 turrets had already been acquired for installation on board the CNL patrol vessels and are ready for shipment. The procedures for use and safety are identical to those stipulated by the MMI [Italian Navy] for 40/70-mm and 76/62-mm weapons. The GdF is already using single 30/80 installations on board the Bigiani-class coast-guard vessels, and the test-firing results obtained from these weapons are deemed to be highly satisfactory. It is obvious that in most situations the use of such powerful weapons—controlled directly by the commanding officer—will have a deterrent function, and that they will be used only to immobilize boats that do not heed the orders given after repeated optical and verbal warnings.

The hull is clearly designed—from a structural standpoint—to house armament that is much heavier (suffice

it to consider that the Ratcharts carry on board one 76/62-mm gun, one 40/70-mm gun, and four MM-38 missiles), and it is foreseeable that if necessary the patrol vessels could be converted rather rapidly by taking on board additional weapons systems. The levels of safety also follow criteria that are standard in military construction: the vessel floats even with two contiguous compartments flooded, with the level of water in the quarters not rising above 30 centimeters.

The electronic equipment includes two GEM navigational radars installed on the mast, and a series of HF, UHF/AM, data-link, and teleprinter communications equipment.

The COC is particularly spacious and makes for excellent livability and for maintenance of the equipment directly on board without the necessity of dismantling it.

To train the personnel—which will have to be prepared to operate on a vessel that is equipped with a veritable combat center—provision has been made for a basic theoretical course to be given by Selenia Elsag at the firm's offices. It is also planned to take the crew (divided into groups of equal size) on board during the 6 months before the vessels are made ready for the tests. After their approval and acceptance, the vessels will carry out a training cruise during which it is anticipated that they will have no operational assignments except in emergency situations.

Surprisingly, no decision has yet been made as to the name to be given to these new patrol vessels (although the designation "Zara class" has been suggested), which will constitute—together with the new coast-guard vessels that will gradually replace the 57 Meattinis—the nucleus of the Customs Service fleet. In this connection, the first two Bigiani-class coast-guard vessels recently went into service, while the contract for two Corrubia-type vessels has already been prepared. Plans call for the construction of an additional four Bigianis and five Corrubias during the next 5 years, so as to reach a total of at least 40 vessels.

Conclusions

The 300-ton patrol vessels for the GdF appear to be perfectly designed to meet the requirements of their projected tasks—a successful compromise between the requirements of great range and capability at sea, on the one hand, and the dimensional and cost limitations of the hull.

There is also an indisputable need for the GdF to be equipped with vessels that are capable of coordinating operational groups consisting of coast-guard vessels, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft (an equal proportion of patrol aircraft will inevitably be integrated into the

operational group concept), and at the same time for it to carry out particular missions such as the pursuit on the high seas of merchant ships engaged in smuggling.

It is in particular a matter of confronting the flourishing traffic in drugs and weapons—a task for which lighter vessels appear unsuited.

There are also a number of tasks—ranging from surveillance of fishing activities to patrolling the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] and rendering assistance—that these vessels will be able to perform without difficulty.

There is no doubt that with these vessels the GdF is finally acquiring the assets it needs to evolve into a genuine Italian coast guard. This evolution has become indispensable, given the scope of the tasks of the GdF. The consolidated experience of the GdF on the seas (more than 90 years)—and the existence of an appropriate organization, its Naval Section—undoubtedly make it easy to take on missions that are even more exacting. It should not be forgotten that the GdF operates at sea more than 300 naval vessels with more than 5,000 specially trained personnel, and also has its own facilities for training the personnel.

Now that the GdF will have acquired the new operational capability made possible by these 300-ton patrol boats, it will be advisable to harmonize—insofar as possible—the presence at sea of so many (too many) governmental agencies and military organizations and thereby avoid harmful overlapping and waste of resources.

[Box, p 56]

Load displacement: 316 tons


Test displacement: 290 tons

Dimensions:

- Overall length: 512 meters
- Length bow to stern: 47.25 meters
- Maximum width: 7.5 meters
- Engine complex: two 3,505-horsepower BC 230.12 GMT's
- Top speed: 28 knots (290 tons)
- Continuous top speed: 26 knots (290 tons)
- Cruising speed: 23 knots
- Range at a speed of 15 knots: 2,700 miles
- Crew: 1 commissioned officer, 10 noncommissioned officers, 20 enlisted personnel
- Armament: two 30-mm Bredas; two 7.62 mm Electronics: one Selenia Elsag Pegasus fire-control center; two GEM navigational radars

300-Ton Patrol Vessel

Block diagram



Constellation-Class Patrol Vessels—Section and Internal Subdivisions Based on the Initial Informal Design

Key:

| | | |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------|
| 1. Pilothouse | 2. Hangar | 3. Passageway |
| 4. Clinic | 5. Laboratory for chemical analysis | 6. Maneuver area |
| 7. Crew's messroom | 8. Quarters for two commissioned officers | 9. Hold |
| 10. Locker | 11. Location of capstans | 12. Boatswain's locker |
| 13. Steering gear | 14. Laundry | 15. Crew's quarters |
| 16. Sanitation | 17. Air conditioning | 18. Stabilization tank |
| 19. Galley | 20. Gyrocompass | 21. Ammunition storeroom |
| 22. Chain well | 23. Storeroom | 24. Location of aft pumps |
| 25. Fuel | 26. Location of amidships pumps | 27. Gunner's locker |
| 28. Dry compartment | | |

10992/6091

Navy To Acquire New Class Patrol Vessels

4 of 'Constellation' Class Ordered

*35280159a Genoa RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA
in Italian Jun 88 pp 44-51*

[Article by Adm Sergio Rissotto, inspector, Navy Corps of Engineers]

[Excerpts]

Italian Patrol Vessels

On other occasions (see *RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA*, February 1984) we have already emphasized the fact that a Navy ship design is conceived when the General Staff, having settled on a particular scenario and postulated particular threats, establishes the tasks that a vessel must perform. In the case of the patrol vessels this practice has been followed only partially, because the design actually does not relate to a military vessel strictly speaking but to

a unit that insofar as possible will be compatible with the military vessels (as we shall subsequently see)—a unit that will be equipped and administered by the Navy [MM] but is intended to perform tasks of a predominantly civilian nature.

The law stipulates that the commanders of the patrol vessels shall be assigned the title of Officer of Judicial Police.

On the advice of the Navy, the following requisites were subsequently established:

Excellent stability at sea up to Force 6; stabilization of the vessel whether stationary or in motion; helicopter service analogous to that of the light units of the Navy, in order to increase the capacity for surveillance and intervention; equipment in accordance with the nautical service and logistic systems of the Navy type but with ample margins as regards standards, to allow for the

possibility of remaining at sea for 15 days; a light-combat system intended for deterrence only; navigational and radar systems in accordance with Navy standards; and communications systems that will enable the units to be incorporated into the chain of operational communications with land-based commands and stations of the Navy and maritime authorities.

The Navy—which is to operate the patrol vessels (Article 9)—is acknowledged to have the task (as prescribed by Article 2, item c) of carrying out the so-called fishery surveillance.

This activity in behalf of the national fishing fleet has already been carried out for several decades by the MMI [Italian Navy] in the waters of the Strait of Sicily—and until recently in the Adriatic as well—utilizing military vessels such as frigates, corvettes, and seagoing and coastal minesweepers and has consequently proved to be very burdensome, exhausting, and uneconomic, inasmuch as it is carried out with aspects that have been designed, equipped, and armed for operational tasks of a far more complex nature.

The fishery surveillance has absorbed—and is still absorbing—a not inconsiderable percentage of the total hours of movement of the naval squadron, giving rise to the inescapable necessity of alleviating the operational burdens of the squadron by means of vessels such as those under construction.

The patrol vessels that the Ministry of the Merchant Marine has ordered from Fincantieri [Shipyards Finance Corporation]-Italian Naval Shipyards will bear the names Cassiopeia, Libra, Orione, and Spica. These units—which belong to the Constellation class—represent the first lot of a series that will have to be very numerous in order to meet the requirements of Law No 979. It is estimated that the first units will be operational beginning in 1989.

In response to these requirements, and with a view to performing the specified functions, units having the following specifications are under construction:

Dimensions: 79.8 meters x 11.8 x 3.5 Freeboard: 4.11 meters Displacement: 1,430 tons Propulsion: two diesel GMT BL/230/16, for an overall 5,435 kw (7,800 C) Electric power: three Isotta Fraschini ID 36 SS6 groups of 500 kva each, plus an emergency group of 120 kva Range: 3,300 miles at 15 knots Armament: one 76/62 MM-type Oto Melara; two 20-mm Quarters: for 78 personnel, consisting of 8 officers, 40 noncommissioned officers, and 30 enlisted personnel

Configuration of the Vessel

The vessel is configured basically by a hull with a continuous upper deck surmounted amidships by a compact superstructure. To optimize stability at sea, the shape of the bow is flared above the water line and full below, while the Plimsoll line and the freeboard are relatively high.

The hull is divided vertically into three 'tween decks, and longitudinally into nine watertight compartments by means of eight watertight bulkheads.

The amidships superstructure is extended aft to form the hangar for the helicopter. Aft of the hangar, the upper deck is completely clear and serves as the flight deck.

The apparatus for mooring and towing are installed on the main deck.

The main deck is continuous, and for considerations of safety it is the deck on which the watertight bulkheads are placed.

The hull is constructed of Fe 42 steel; the deckhouses are constructed of a light alloy and are bound to the hull by means of Datacouple joints.

Proceeding from the bow, the following are under the main deck:

—First compartment: lockers.

—Second compartment: lockers and ammunition store-room.

—Third compartment: hold for storage of various equipment and spare parts; it is served by a 24-ton crane.

—Fourth compartment: galley storeroom, gyrocompass room, and location of the forward pumps.

—Fifth compartment: engine complex.

—Sixth compartment: electric power plant.

—Seventh compartment: air conditioning plant, passive stabilization tank, and location of the aft pumps.

—Eighth compartment: crew's quarters.

—Ninth compartment: location of steering gear.

The principal logistic services (galley, messroom, quarters, captain's offices) are on the main deck; the officers' wardroom, various quarters, and operations room are in the superstructures. The fire control for the 76/62 gun is installed in the last deckhouse.

Engine Complex and Electric Power Plant

The engine complex is of the twin-screw, bimotor diesel type. It consists of two GMT BL 230/16 engines each of which is joined—by means of a coupling, a reducer, and a line of shafts—to a screw propeller that has adjustable blades. The engine complex is normally operated by remote control from a suitable control center. In an emergency it can also be operated on the spot.

The electric power plant—consisting of three 500-kva IF groups—is operated by remote control from the control center of the engine complex. In an emergency the generators can be operated on the spot. The emergency generator is installed aft on the main deck.

Stabilization

The vessel is equipped with two stabilization systems:

—A pair of fins that reduce a 30 percent free roll to 3 percent when the vessel is proceeding at 14 knots.


The installation makes possible a considerable measure of comfort for the ship's personnel—especially when they are engaged in a mission of long duration—and provides a platform stability sufficient for normal use of the helicopter.

—A Flume-type passive-stabilization tank that makes it possible to stabilize the platform even when the vessel is standing still. This facilitates the launching of the small boats (especially the unsinkable type) and the recovery of the boats together with any shipwreck victims.

Air Conditioning

The vessel is equipped with a complete summer-and-winter air conditioning system for all living quarters and operations rooms.

The following conditions will be provided: in winter, 18 degrees [centigrade] indoors when it is -3 degrees outdoors, and 27 degrees indoors when it is 35 degrees outdoors.



Constellation-Class Patrol Vessels—Section and Internal Subdivisions Based on the Initial Informal Design

Key:

1. Pilothouse
2. Hangar
3. Passageway
4. Clinic
5. Laboratory for chemical analysis
6. Maneuver area
7. Crew's messroom
8. Quarters for two commissioned officers
9. Hold
10. Locker
11. Location of capstans
12. Boatswain's locker
13. Steering gear
14. Laundry
15. Crew's quarters
16. Sanitation
17. Air conditioning
18. Stabilization tank
19. Galley
20. Gyrocompass
21. Ammunition storeroom
22. Chain well
23. Storeroom
24. Location of aft pumps
25. Fuel
26. Location of amidships pumps
27. Gunner's locker
28. Dry compartment

Assistance on the Open Sea

To carry out missions of assistance on the open sea, the patrol vessel is equipped to perform many services:

a. Air service: All preparations exist for housing on deck, recovering, and resupplying an Agusta AB-212 light helicopter. In addition to constituting a long-range arm for surveillance, the helicopter can be used either to transport equipment and personnel on board, to rescue persons aboard vessels that are in danger, or to rescue shipwreck victims. Personnel who require medical treatment on the patrol vessels can be admitted to a four-bed infirmary that is outfitted with medical and surgical equipment.

b. Firefighting and exhaustion service: For firefighting, two monitors are installed that throw water and foam for up to 60 meters; each monitor is fed by a 300 t/h electric pump and is equipped with an appropriate 400-liter tank of foam-generating liquid. For prolonged firefighting operations, there is a 9-ton reserve tank of foam-generating liquid. In addition, vessels in difficulty can be supplied with firefighting or exhaustion equipment—transportable in a sling—that is part of the safety service of the vessel.

c. Service for rescue of shipwreck victims: The vessel is equipped with an 8.5-meter motorboat and a 5-meter pneumatic boat with a 50-horsepower engine which are

intended primarily for operation by the vessel itself; it is also equipped with an 8.5-meter unsinkable, self-righting "cuttlefish" that is equipped with a 110-horsepower engine; is capable of developing a speed of 13.5 knots; and has a range of 120 miles at a speed of 9.5 knots.


The "cuttlefish" carries a crew of two and can transport up to 10 persons in safety.

The patrol boat can take on board a multipost decompression chamber; is equipped with the prescribed nets for the rescue of shipwreck victims; and can tow a smaller vessel at a speed of up to 6 knots.

Technical and Logistic Support for Other Vessels

To satisfy the requirements in question, the following have been provided:

- Sleeping accommodations—in addition to those for the on-board personnel—intended for persons in transit, technicians, scientists, or personnel of support vessels.
- Two shops—a machine shop and an electrical-electronic shop—capable of making emergency repairs.
- Facilities for supplying electric power, water, and diesel fuel to smaller vessels.
- Spare parts, stored in the capacious forward hold and movable by means of the hydraulic crane.



Antipollution Facilities

It is a well-known fact that merchant and military vessels flying the Italian flag are forbidden—in accordance with national and international laws—to discharge into the sea any hydrocarbons, mixtures of hydrocarbons, or other substances harmful to the marine environment as enumerated in the respective official lists.

However, pollution—especially by hydrocarbons—can occur as a result of fraud, carelessness, or damage. It is therefore essential to take care that the regulations are enforced, with the aim of challenging and documenting violations and/or intervening to limit the damage. To this end the patrol boats are equipped with the following:

- A laboratory for special chemical analysis.
- Facilities for reclamation using a dispersant delivered from special directional-spray booms installed in the forward area.
- Facilities for the containment of pollution by means of floating booms.
- Facilities for the collection of polluting materials by means of a sea skimmer.
- Facilities for the retention on board—in appropriate accumulation containers—of the material recovered by the sea skimmer.

The patrol vessel has no facilities for the direct discharge of its own waste overboard. Every liquid or solid is preventively treated by means of a black-water-treatment installation, a bilgewater-treatment installation, rotary triturators, and an installation for compacting negative-impact products.

Conclusions

With the acquisition of the patrol vessels, a series of new experiences will be initiated for the Navy—experiences that will involve the vast sea area around Italy as defined by application of the new "Law of the Sea."

The "Convention on the Law of the Sea" signed in December 1982 by the great majority of the nations of the world after more than 10 years in preparation has in fact extended the maritime area over which the nations have the exclusive right to carry out economic activities—such as the exploitation of the mineral resources on the bottom, and underneath the bottom—up to 200 miles from the coast or from a line connecting the salient points on the coast with the neighboring islands, under special arrangements negotiated between the countries directly concerned wherever the limited dimensions of the sea do not permit the literal application of the norm (the Adriatic, Strait of Sicily, etc.). The area thus defined is designated as the "Exclusive Economic Zone" (ZEE).

The naval forces intended for the tasks of surveillance, inspection, and assistance in the ZEE have accordingly become an absolute necessity.

Concurrently, the Italian shipbuilding industry, by carrying out the patrol boat project, will be able to penetrate this special sector of construction with excellent prospects for substantial domestic orders in the market for OPV's [offshore patrol vessels]. This market is destined with certainty to expand greatly throughout the world and particularly in the Mediterranean, where all the coastal nations—because of their close proximity to each other—are strongly oriented toward protection of their own interests.

Other Patrol Vessels Ordered or Built

35280159a Genoa *RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA*
in Italian Jun 88 pp 51-53

[Article by Pierangelo Caiati: "Inshore Patrol Vessels: Other Italian Achievements"]

[Text] In addition to those cited in the above article, numerous other classes of inshore patrol vessels have been built—or are still under construction—in various Italian shipyards.

'Gold Medal' Class

These are being built by Fincantieri-CNI [Shipyards Finance Corporation-Italian Naval Shipyards] for the Customs Service at the Muggiano Naval Shipyard (La Spezia). (See elsewhere in this issue of *RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA*.)

The first two units have already been funded and laid down, and have a load displacement of 316 tons. Plans call for the acquisition of additional vessels of identical type. Their dimensions are 51 x 7.50 x 4.60 meters; their top continuous speed is 25 knots; their range is 2,700 miles at 15 knots; their armament consists of a twin turret with 30-mm Bredas and two 7.62-mm machine guns; and they carry a 31-man crew. As soon as they are on line, they will be the largest vessels of the Naval Section of the Customs Service that can be used for patrolling the ZEE in collaboration with—and in support of—the patrol vessels of the Constellation class.

CP 400 Class

These are eight vessels for the Port Authority Corps; they are divided into two subclasses of four each (CP 401-404 and CP 405-408), are intended primarily for rescue operations, and are being built respectively by the Ancona Naval Ship Repair Yard and by the Trapani CN [Shipyard] Dry Dock. CP 401 and CP 402 were laid down in the initial months of 1987, and the remaining two will be laid down by this summer. These are steel vessels with a load displacement of 130 tons; they measure 28.60 x 6.20 x 2 meters, are powered by four 880-horsepower Isotta Fraschini ID 36SS8V's that produce a top speed of 22 knots,

and have a range of more than 1,000 miles. Devoid of heavy weaponry (the installation of a 20-mm machine gun and two 8-mm machine guns is under consideration), these vessels are equipped with an 8.50-meter self-righting, unsinkable "cuttlefish" capable of receiving 10 shipwreck victims and carry a crew of 11.

In the case of the four vessels ordered from the Trapani Shipyard Dry Dock, however, the situation is as follows: The first two vessels—CP 405 and CP 406 (for the shipyard, Nos 18 and 19)—will be launched in June, and plans call for the other two vessels to be laid down shortly thereafter. These motor launches are differentiated from the four under construction at Ancona as follows: There is no "daughter" boat on board; the load displacement is 132 tons; the dimensions are 29.50 x 6.70 x 1.83 meters; and they are powered by four 1,375-horsepower CRM 12V D/SS. Performance and crew size are identical for all eight vessels, which are also capable of receiving about 50 shipwreck victims.

Bigliani G.80 Class

These are being built by the Crestitalia Shipyard of Ameglia (La Spezia) for the Naval Section of the Customs Service. (See RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA, No 12/87, p 18.)

These are patrol vessels with a load displacement of 85 tons—coast-guard vessels of very high performance and capability. They are destined to replace—over a period of time—the existing coast-guard vessels of the Meattini class (56 currently in service). The first two units—G.80 Bigliani and G.81 Cavaglia—have already been built and were delivered to the Port Authority Corps last October, but another two to four vessels are scheduled to enter into service in from 4 to 5 years. The Bigliani-class patrol vessels measure 26.40 x 6.95 x 1.06 meters; are powered by two 3,480-horsepower MTU 16V 396 TB-94 engines; and have a top speed of 45 knots and a range of 1,200 miles at 18.5 knots. Their armament consists of one 30-mm Breda machine gun and two 7.62-mm MG-42/59's, and they carry a crew of 12.

Corrubia-Type Patrol Vessels

Contracts were awarded recently—pursuant to competitive bidding—for two vessels considered to be prototypes of this type of patrol vessel (named "Corrubia"), which is destined for the Naval Section of the Customs Service. The two patrol vessels (designated as "fast coast-guard vessels of the Customs Service") will have a load displacement of 75 tons, dimensions of 25 x 7 meters, a top speed of 40 knots, and two Isotta Fraschini engines. Their principal armament will be—as in the case of the Bigliani—a single 30-mm Breda weapons system equipped with a Medusa track, and current plans call for a crew of 12. Long-range plans call for the acquisition of an additional 18 vessels of this type.

Baglietto 23-Meter Patrol Vessels

These are vessels with a load displacement of 48 tons. They measure 23 meters in overall length, are powered by two 1,780-horsepower MTU's, are capable of a top speed of 40 knots, and have a range of 700 miles at a speed of 20 knots. Built of a light alloy of aluminum, these vessels have been built in two lots of two each, the last of which were delivered in the second half of 1987 to the United Arab Emirates.

Their armament consists of one 20-mm Oerlikon, and they carry a crew of 10 to 12.

CP Class/CP 314 Type

Two units are involved: the CP 314 and CP 315, built for the Port Authority Corps by the Baglietto Shipyard at Varazze, a division of the Rodriguez Group. The first vessel was delivered last 20 February, and the second in May. These rescue motor launches measure 17.96 x 5.60 x 1.22 meters; have a load displacement of 43 tons; and are powered by two 850-horsepower 12 D/S CRM's, which provide a top speed of more than 21 knots and a range of 400 miles. They carry a crew of seven and can receive 20 persons on board.

Super Drago Type

Two 17-meter patrol vessels of the "Super Drago" type have been ordered by the Customs Service from the Intermarine Shipyard at Sarzana; they are powered by two 1,250-horsepower Isotta Fraschini ID 36SS8V'S that are reputedly capable of very high performance. The two vessels—one with Riva Calzoni hydrojet propulsion and the other with propeller propulsion—will serve as prototypes for experimentation with a view to their adoption on a massive scale. Their load displacement is 20 tons, their top speed is 48 knots, and their range is 12 hours at 20 knots. Classified as "fast launches," they will carry a crew of five; their armament will be based on one NATO 7.62-mm MG 42/59 caliber machine gun. They are intended to replace the 15 fast vessels of the Drago type—built by Italcraft—that are currently in service, and will be the fastest coastal patrol vessels in operation along the Italian coasts or—probably—in the entire Mediterranean. In addition to the 15 vessels to be replaced, the long-range plans call for the acquisition of another 15 vessels of this type, for a total of 30.

CP 200 Class/CP 254 Type

In addition to what has already been stated in this article, it should be added that these vessels are powered by a 750-horsepower Isotta Fraschini ID 36SS6V linked to the Riva Calzoni IRC 43DL hydrojet by hydraulic friction. Two of these vessels—CP 254 and CP 255—have gone into service, while two others are under construction.

CP 200 Class/CP 256 Type

Built to meet the same specifications as those of the Port Authority Corps that led to the acquisition of the CP 254/255 type, the CP 256 patrol vessel was constructed entirely of glass-reinforced resin by Italcraft; measures approximately 16 meters; is powered by a 900-horsepower 12 DS/2 CRM; and is equipped with Riva Calzoni IRC 43DL hydrojet propulsion, which provides a top speed of approximately 32 knots. It carries a crew of seven. Two additional units were ordered recently and are under construction.

Smaller Units

In addition, a number of 14.50-meter fast patrol vessels each with a displacement of 15 tons and a top speed of 35 knots and equipped with a 500-horsepower Isotta Fraschini engine have been built by the Gulf of Gaeta Naval Shipyard. Fourteen vessels of this type have been ordered by the Naval Section of the National Police.

Last, two 14-meter fast patrol vessels whose specifications are not yet known have been ordered by an unspecified customer from the Baglietto Shipyard.

Fast patrol vessels have also been built by the Posillipo Shipyard at Sabaudia, and are included in the plans of Azimut/Benetti and Italcraft.

10992/6091

SWEDEN

Forces Commander Warns Conscription System Under Threat

Cites High Personnel Costs

36500155 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
31 Jul 88 p 6

[Report on interview with Gen Bengt Gustafsson, supreme commander of the Armed Forces, by Anders Hellberg; date and place not given; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] A radical change in the conscription system may be the result if the Armed Forces do not receive more money over the next 20 years, says Gen Bengt Gustafsson, supreme commander of the Armed Forces [OB], in an interview with DAGENS NYHETER.

"Then we will have to take a look at what threats to the country exist and what the risks are, and it may turn out that not every conscript will have to be trained," says Gustafsson.

The supreme commander says that "the two pillars of Swedish defense policy—equitable universal conscription and a domestic defense industry—are now in danger":

"I feel that the system of universal conscription is very important, and I am convinced that the Swedish people feel the same way."

10 Weeks

"But the answer cannot be to maintain universal conscription by paying no attention to the shape the Armed Forces are in."

When Bengt Gustafsson says that there may be some "tampering with universal conscription," he does not mean that some conscripts will receive no training at all. Instead, he is thinking of the possibility of allowing part of the new Army to receive only 10 weeks of training, as outlined by the Army commander in chief.

Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson has said in a letter to the newspaper OSTA SMALAND that differentiated conscription is not appropriate.

The Armed Forces, and particularly the Army, are facing major changes. The OB and the commanders of the three services feel that the Armed Forces did not receive enough money in the latest 5-year defense decision to "be able to meet the established goals."

Firm Decision

The problem is that the Social Democrats do not want to give the Armed Forces more money. Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson told Parliament last fall that "the defense decision is firm—there will be no more money."

Moreover, the OB has been instructed to determine how the Army will develop through the end of the century within that unaltered financial framework.

So Bengt Gustafsson is not being allowed to come up with various alternatives based on how much money he wants. Instead, he is to specify how he wants the Army to operate with the money the government is willing to provide.

Besides the offensive assault brigades, Army Commander in Chief Erik G. Bengtsson's radical proposal included a territorial defense force of 120,000 men, guard forces consisting of 100,000 men, and a beefed-up Home Guard.

Four Areas

The territorial defense force would defend certain important points so as to allow the assault brigades to confront the enemy quickly. The guard forces, which would receive only 10 weeks of training, would guard mobilization stores, electric power plants, and other important facilities all over the country.

Today's six military districts, the traditional "Milo's," would be reduced to only four. The Western Military District and the Bergslagen Military District would disappear.

It was when the Army commander in chief put forward his proposal that the big hullabaloo broke out. Career officers—both active and retired—have divided into two camps, and the accusations have come thick and fast.

'To Meet and Stop'

To understand the agitated feelings about something as theoretical as the future structure of the Army, one must know what the Swedish Armed Forces are traditionally organized to defend.

In every defense decision since the war, it has been stated that the Swedish Armed Forces are to "meet, stop, and defeat" an enemy attempting to invade and gain a foothold in Swedish territory. If the Swedish forces fail and the enemy manages to establish a bridgehead, the Armed Forces are to "engage in persevering defensive fighting over the entire territory."

But now there is not enough money to implement both those principles.

Stopping the enemy at the border—known as "shell defense" in the debate—requires that heavily armed units be concentrated in Upper Norrland, the Stockholm area, Skane, and Gotland, those being the areas where an enemy might conceivably land.

Engaging in persevering defensive fighting requires, on the other hand, that a larger number of units be spread throughout the country's territory.

Cutbacks

"If we are to achieve both objectives, nearly 25 brigades will be required," says Bengt Gustafsson. "But there will not be enough money for that."

The country currently has 28 brigades, and the decision has been made to reduce that to 26.

A Swedish brigade consists of six battalions for a total of about 5,000 men.

The Army commander in chief pointed out that by the turn of the century, there would be only enough money for 16 brigades equipped to implement the principle of stopping and defeating an enemy at the border. But that same principle requires more than 16 brigades if the Army is to be present everywhere that the enemy might conceivably land.

In the case of persevering defensive fighting, there is enough money for 19 brigades, since these do not need all the equipment required for stopping an enemy. But that is still not enough to defend the entire land area.

Impossible

Here is the dilemma: whichever principle is chosen, there will not be enough money to provide the number of modern brigades required for the principle chosen.

That is what the critics have focused upon. Since the entire country cannot be defended with the number of brigades we can afford, the OB and the army commander in chief should either talk about that or resign, say the critics.

"But I do not intend to threaten to resign; I don't think anyone would care," says Bengt Gustafsson with a laugh.

We asked: "Which principle do you yourself think should apply?"

"It is impossible to choose. This country should be able to afford both principles," says Gustafsson. "If this financial level is going to remain in force in the future, we will have to start reconsidering our defense policy."

Personnel Costs

The OB says: "Looking at it realistically, there is not room in this financial framework for both principles: that of equitable universal conscription and that calling for a domestic defense industry."

He emphasizes that personnel costs have risen by from 4-5 billion kronor since 1970-71 despite a reduction in personnel:

"The rest of the public sector has been compensated at a rate of 2 percent per year. We haven't, and we are where we are because of that 4 or 5 billion kronor."

Sacred Cow

"When I took this job," says Bengt Gustafsson, "I didn't know that the finances were so bad, but I realized that the conscription system was in danger."

According to the OB, those involved in the defense debate should "steer clear of sacred cows." Does this mean that universal conscription is such a sacred cow?

"Yes. If our defense costs are still going to be at this level 20 years from now, we cannot start setting up sacred cows," says the OB.

Concerning the other pillar of Swedish defense policy—a domestic defense industry—the OB feels that from the standpoint of production, things "look good at the moment" except at the Karlskrona Shipyard.

"But from the standpoint of the future, the ammunition, artillery, and missile industry will get along until next year—after that there is nothing."

Cancellations

Lack of money has forced the OB to cancel several heavy defense systems, including some for the new JAS fighter plane and Combat Vehicle 90.

"There are two possibilities," the OB points out. "Either the Armed Forces receive more money outside the financial framework or we delete some of the equipment which the 1987 defense decision says the military are supposed to buy."

We said: "But the minister of defense says there is not going to be any more money."

Bengt Gustafsson answered: "We have other political parties, you know, and if they are going to constitute a political majority, they will have to unite."

Would Shorten Training Period

36500155 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
3 Aug 88 p 2

[Editorial: "The OB Against the Colonel's Revolt"]

[Text] An campaign poster just put out by the Conservatives is the only sign so far that any political party might voluntarily bring up defense policy as a campaign issue. Not until 2 weeks after the election, when OB Bengt Gustafsson is scheduled to present his "Armed Forces Report 88," can the politicians be expected to have the data they need for deciding on the elimination of units, conscript training times, and possible appropriation increases.

But the basic question is how Sweden is going to be defended militarily in the event of a war. The choice of strategy should then provide guidance as far as the more specific decisions are concerned.

Whether the Army's funds in general will be spent on a smaller number of modernized brigades or whether, instead, we will maintain a larger lineup of brigades at a lower technical level must in the long run be a political decision. If the first option is chosen, the objective would be to meet an aggressor in a decisive encounter at an early stage near our coasts or land frontiers. If the second is chosen, it would be more a case of being able to continue a protracted struggle after the aggressor had gained a foothold in some part of the country.

Intense debate has surrounded those questions of principle for at least the past 6 months, with the Armed Forces and Army Commands on one side of the argument and a number of army officers, particularly in southern and western Sweden, on the other. While the OB and the army commander in chief have, in their

statements of opinion and draft reports, given their views on how the Army would need to be restructured, their opponents in the debate have made great efforts to arouse local opinion in those corners of the country threatened with the loss of their local regiments. The unit commanders concerned have often put forward emotional arguments making it sound as though parts of the country would be undefended, and along with that, a greater differentiation in conscript training times has been described as a threat to the principles of universal conscription.

When the OB spoke at a conference of the Swedish Civil Defense League last Monday, he displayed more irritation than before at that "colonel's revolt," chiefly because the critics were unable to offer any coherent alternatives. The OB fears a future situation in which the defense appropriation will not be able to cover much more than personnel costs, chiefly at the expense of materiel procurement. Like the former army commander in chief, he now wants to limit the training time for conscripts in the so-called guard forces to 2.5 months. According to the OB, a 5-month training period for conscripts, as proposed by the critics, would make it necessary to further reduce the number of assault brigades.

The debate is made more difficult by the fact that opponents of the OB's proposal do not consider themselves bound to pay any real attention to the long-term appropriation limits set by the government. Both sides agree that the Armed Forces need more money and that the number of brigades should be larger. The difference, however, is that the OB and the army commander in chief are forced to base their arguments on reality.

The chairman of the Reserve Officers Association, Roger Johansson, claimed in a recent article in SVENSKA DAGBLADET that the OB wants to close down 11 regiments. He even provided a list of the threatened units. The OB himself denied this by shifting responsibility for that decision to the politicians, but so far there is silence in that quarter. Earlier, however, Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson and the Social Democratic defense politician, Olle Goransson, had adopted a negative attitude toward the idea of shortening conscription periods for certain groups suggested by the army commander in chief and the OB. But Social Democratic views on how the Army should look in the future remain a secret.

The Conservatives have also opposed such a short training period, although with the difference that they are simultaneously advocating a higher defense appropriation. But if more money were appropriated, it should be used for replacement and modernization, not for maintaining a largely outmoded Army. So far, the Liberal Party is the only party to have agreed with the main principles behind the OB's and the army commander in chief's proposals.

But all the parties are keeping quiet about their views, even though the time for making a decision is fast approaching. Now the HALSINGE-KURIKEN and the ARBETARBLADET, both Social Democratic newspapers, are writing: "Don't tamper with I-14 [Halsinge Regiment]." And such regional voices can be expected to grow more numerous. It is not in the overall interest for those politicians and molders of public opinion who are

advocating a more modern but smaller Army to hold back their arguments. On the contrary, there is danger in the fact that campaign promises made in roughhewn form for tactical reasons may come to hinder the effort to produce a functioning military defense even with limited resources.

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FINLAND

Papers Support Laine's Proposals Regarding Trade With USSR

Credits at 'Normal Interest'
36500161 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 31 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "Eastern Trade Solution at Top Level"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] A mutual hunt for Eastern trade scapegoats is taking place in the best glasnost spirit, Bjorn Mansson notes, as he welcomes Jermu Laine's proposal for a solution to the problem at the top level.

General Director of Customs and former Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine is not the first to suggest that President Mauno Koivisto, together with Party Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev, try at the highest level to solve the balance problem in our Eastern trade.

Such suggestions, often characterized as highly objectionable by the Social Democrats, have usually come from the political opposition, that is, from the Center Party and the far left, and similar voices have also been heard from business.

Before the presidential election, the candidates Vayrynen, Kivisto, and Kajanoja demanded a more active role by the president in eastern trade.

But this is the first time that a highly placed man in government, a foremost representative of a governing party with many years of personal experience with eastern trade, has dared to express the thought.

As SUOMEN SOCIALIDEMOKRAATTI pointed out in connection with its interview with Jermu Laine, he was for 14 years a member of the Finland-Soviet Economic Cooperation Commission Presidium and for 7 years foreign trade minister with responsibility for, among other things, our Soviet trade. (On the other hand, it is precisely for this reason that his statement has the odor of wisdom after the fact!)

When a Social Democrat like Laine addresses the president, it can hardly be pushed aside as a political tactic. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that the president is in agreement.

Laine's initiative will certainly find an echo among many friendly people who expect a more active role from the highest position and who considered the president's attitude, such as it appeared, for example, before this year's elections, to be a little nonchalant.

The expectations directed toward President Koivisto have naturally been joined nostalgically to the personal efforts of his predecessor, Urho Kekkonen. But in every comparison it should be remembered that the situation is now different:

First of all, it is clear that Kekkonen's "counterparts," Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and particularly Kosygin during the Soviet economy's developmental phases at the time had a better grip on trade than Koivisto's first counterpart, the aging Brezhnev, and the short-lived Andropov and Chernenko. The tradition simply stopped short.

Second, Gorbachev, just as, among others, government head Ryshkov, has been occupied both with inner reform policy and with a more global perspective than with trade with a little border country.

Third, the present perestroika means, as is well known, that responsibility for foreign trade, is delegated down from the party and state heads to individual firms and regions.

And finally one must always remember that the balance problem in trade is now the opposite from what it was in Kekkonen's time:

Particularly after the oil crisis in the 1970's, it was important to increase Finnish exports. Now, on the contrary, it is important to increase imports from the Soviets. It is not as obliging to function as the highest import booster as it is to act as the highest sales promoter.

But Laine has not proposed business tasks for Koivisto and Gorbachev, either. There are two specific matters he thinks they might "fix" at the highest level:

First, to see how the long-range agreement of 1977 on trade between the countries is working, and how its principles are being applied. Laine reminds us that the purpose of the agreement was to free the trade from much too strong a dependence upon economic swings—that is to say, among other things, the price of oil.

Is the agreement just a useless piece of paper, he asks provocatively.

And secondly, to agree concretely that "the main part" of the balance due should be handled with "long term monetary credit arrangements."

Laine suggests that the credits be accorded "normal international interests," and advocates a sufficiently long time for repayments for trade to be stabilized at a high level. He believes that new import goods will gradually turn up, and he assumes that the price of oil will probably rise again in the 1990's.

The proposal is by no means new. Last spring It was spelled out, among other things, by the head of the Workers' Economic Research Institute, Pekka Korpinen, as what he called money basket credit.

HUFVUDSTATSBLADET'S Eastern trade expert, P.E. Paul, had the idea as late as in an article 18 July when he pointed out that Finland's cash reserve was up over 30 billion and therefore should clear the way for a large currency loan to the Soviets—in accordance with, among other things, the West German and the Japanese examples.

It is certainly useful that Laine has given the idea increased authority.

Finland's favorable balance of trade is already up close to 5 billion marks, of which interest is being paid on only a part. (At the same time, new figures from the License Office show that Finnish export agreements for another 5 billion are waiting to get a license....)

Laine calls the Soviet debt a national economic burden for Finland, and points to the risk involved in the devaluation of the ruble, which may come sooner or later, at the latest before it can be made convertible.

A researcher at Finland's Academy had the same thought the other day. He called a devaluation clause "to say the least, probable."

Laine speaks of the risk that Finland, "in the worst case," may lose hundreds of millions of marks. If one can believe an Austrian estimate of how overvalued the ruble officially is today, it could quite simply be a question of billions.

In the interview, Laine also suggests more flexible rules for joint enterprises and supports, among other things, the idea put forth by the forest industry's Matti Pekkanen for large cooperative forest projects in the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, he does not go into the need for complementing the bilateral clearing trade with trade in convertible currencies. He only notes the weaknesses in the present system.

But the interview was not devoted mainly to proposals, but to what might be called a Finnish contribution to the debate on who should bear the guilt for the present imbalance of trade.

From this point of view, it may be regarded as an answer to the accusations that, among others, the head of the Soviet trade group, Vladimir Pugin, recently made against Finnish businesses of inactivity, particularly in regard to the so-called Kola project.

Laine chose to make counter accusations. His list of Soviet sins is long, and even in a time of glasnost unique in being delivered by a Finnish (let alone a Finance Department) politician:

"The much too one-sided Soviet export structure comprising over 90 percent energy and other raw materials is completely improper for a modern industrial country and reminds one to some extent of a little underdeveloped country's foreign trade model."

Citing government head Ryskov's recent admission, Laine criticizes the bad quality of Soviet goods, their daily marketing and service, and the uncertain prices.

In this connection, he calls to mind that only a fraction of the list of desired import goods that was made up during his time as foreign trade minister has been delivered. He says flatly that the Soviets still sell certain products that Finland needs to other Western countries, which pay in currency.

Moreover he accuses the Soviet authorities of clumsiness, bureaucratic rigidity, and unwillingness to take risks.

Laine was also ironical about the Soviet claim that we "cannot afford" to pay for the goods we want to buy. "When the situation was the other way around, we were not allowed to say that we could not afford the goods, he pointed out.

Laine dismisses Pugin's accusations on to the Kola project by saying that the Soviets themselves do not seem to know what they want.

A reciprocal hunt for scapegoats in Eastern trade has therefore begun. In the best glasnost spirit the problem is now being called by its right name. Maybe this will be enough to clear the air.

New ideas would definitely be useful. People are looking among others, toward the new Soviet ambassador, Boris Aristov, the recently transferred foreign trade minister. Perhaps the former colleagues Aristov and Laine could work well together?

In the debate on our Eastern trade it is always important to remember two basic factors:

First, after the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland is still the Soviet's largest trading partner in the West. It is only natural that we will sooner or later be outdistanced by larger economic powers, because Soviet trade with the West is expanding.

And second, it is a principle in our economic system that we only buy such goods as we need.

Moreover, the same principle certainly applies also to the Soviet Union, in spite of its different economic system.

Other Newspapers Comment
36500161 Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in
Swedish 31 Jul 88 p 2

[Editorial roundup]

[Excerpt] Jermu Laine's criticism of the Soviet Union's manner of handling its trade with Finland and his proposal that the balance problem be solved at the highest level has already been discussed yesterday in a few newspapers. HELSINGIN SANOMAT and UUSI SUOMI welcome the open debate, UUSI SUOMI however with the reservation that Laine has allowed himself to be provoked into sharp comments. The Center Party newspaper, ILKKA, also welcomes Laine's initiative but points out that it seems like hindsight and contains an indirect admission that the Center Party and Varyrynen were right in their criticism of Eastern trade a few years ago. (Press cutting editor today: Bjorn Mansson).

Good To Have Open Debate on Eastern Trade

The debate on the problem in trade between Finland and the Soviet Union has surprisingly become remarkably open, according to HELSINGIN SANOMAT. Things are being called by their right names.

"This is good, because Eastern trade has been surrounded for an unnecessarily long time by secrecy and mystery. When all went well, no one dug into the problem. The main thing was that agreements were made and trade continued.

"The new openness has been brought about by perestroika. In Finland one sees that one can now speak more freely without the person speaking being branded as a spoiler of relations with our neighbor. This is of course not at all the case. The trade situation demands an analysis. If we do not deal with the problem, we will stand before a crisis."

HELSINGIN SANOMAT points to the recent Soviet contribution to the debate, blaming Finland:

"This is definitely not the first time that the Soviets have accused the Finns of inactivity and clumsiness. Similar claims have been heard even earlier from Soviet representatives, but the Finns have refused to comment openly upon them. The Finns' Eastern trade criticism has primarily been directed toward clearing up which of its own country's politicians were responsible for the trade difficulties and who should do more to solve them."

Only Jermu Laine speaks up in his own name, HELSINGIN SANOMAT notes:

"Laine's contribution carries a certain weight because President Mauno Koivisto supported him when 2 years ago he landed on the firing line of trade policy."

HELSINGIN SANOMAT thinks that Laine's initiative does not contain anything new or special, and that his ideas are well known, but what is different from before is the initiative's cogency.

"Laine is within reasonable boundaries in wanting to keep the two countries' highest leadership away from the daily balance problem. He proposes that at the top level they should only take up questions of principle in Eastern trade. This is a good idea, for if both countries want to keep trade at a high level and if the problem cannot be solved at lower levels, perhaps the authority of the government leaders could get things started from the standstill they are in."

Laine Unnecessarily Pointed

It is good that Jermu Laine speaks clearly, UUSI SUOMI writes in a lead article.

"One can assume that the viewpoints discussed here were discussed with the foreign policy leadership."

"It is another matter how the views should be formulated. One should not allow oneself to be provoked. Laine could have smoothed out certain pointed remarks without losing the essence of the message."

"Laine's proposal to make the favorable balance into a long term currency credit with interest is nothing new, but it is central. Not until the basic problems have been cleared up can we discuss new initiatives."

'Monday Morning Quarterback Laine Admits: The Center Party Was Right'

The Center Party newspaper ILKKA remembers what happened previously in the Eastern trade debate:

"We still remember well the criticism Center Party spokesman Paavo Vayrynen was exposed to in the fall of 1986 when he proposed extensive actions to solve the imbalance of trade. The Social Democratic Party's spokesman of the time, Kalevi Sorsa, then minister and spokesman for the Economic Commission, was so angry during his trip to China that he said he would no longer speak with Vayrynen. The Social Democrats accused Vayrynen of playing with Eastern relations and even of harming the country's interests."

"One must also remember that when the Center Party's Riksdag group in the budget debate proposed that the problem be solved at as high a level as possible, Laine got mad because it was pushing the Soviet partner. Now he himself proposes negotiations between government heads to solve the problem."

"It is very consoling to see that among the Social Democrats, who have minimized the problems of Eastern trade, there are still some who understand the depth and breadth of the issue. It will be interesting to see whether in his circle Laine will become the voice crying in the wilderness. Will the Social Democratic Party's leadership criticize him for following his personal interests and for disturbing relations?

"Let us hope that this does not happen. The balance of trade is a task that requires support from all citizen groups and all political groups even up to the head of the republic."

Concerning Laine's suggestion that one should discuss trade principles on a high level and agree on currency credit, ILKKA continued:

"There is certainly justification for this. But there is definitely a clear amount of hindsight in Laine's suggestions. They should have been carried out as early as 2 or 3 years ago—when Laine as foreign trade minister was responsible for our country's Eastern trade.

"After the Eastern trade interview with Laine one wonders why he does not suggest that Finland and the Soviet Union handle part of their trade with convertible currencies. It is not enough just to correct the present situation without an arrangement that assures the balance in the future.

"No matter how much hindsight we notice in Laine's initiative, it should still be greeted with thanks. From the Social Democratic Party's side it is the first admission, to be sure not expressed, that the Center Party was right in the fall of 1986. Recognizing the facts is the first step toward the correct solutions."

As an illustration for its lead article, ILKKA chose a clip from 1986 with the lines, "Social Democratic Party leadership angry at Vayrynen: Center Party playing presidential politics and hurting the country's interests," and "Jermu Laine disturbed."

Soviet Warnings Discounted
36500161 Helsinki HUVUDSTADSBLADET in
Swedish 4 Aug 88 p 10

[Article by Patricia Winckelmann-Ziliacus: "Soviet Trade—A Challenge"]

[Text] "I don't want to be an ambassador anymore, either in the United States or in any other country. Multilateral issues have always interested me more than bilateral ones, not to mention the fact that by now I have been sent out quite enough."

Thus speaks Under Secretary Paavo Kaarlehto, the highest man in the civil service pyramid in the trade policy section of the Foreign Office—the man who is expected to see that exports move both to the West and the East.

Neither the integration in the West nor perestroika in the East bothers Kaarlehto.

"If Finland manages its economy and its competitive ability, the country will handle the European integration no matter how it takes shape in practice," Kaarlehto thinks. He seems at the same time a bit skeptical about the European Community's grandiose plans for freedom over the borders for everything from goods, services, capital, and labor.

"During the first 10 years of the EC, a great deal took place within the free trade organization. Since 1965 there has been more talk than action. The near future will show how realistic the integration plans really are. The central, difficult questions as well as a unification of the countries' tax systems have to be accomplished bit by bit. Otherwise there will be no integration in practice," Kaarlehto said.

If our companies have goods that are desirable and competitive in price in the Western market, there is no reason to believe that we will not be able to maintain a high level of trade with the Soviet Union. The division into clearing trade and currency trade is artificial, according to Kaarlehto. If the Soviet Union thinks that the Finnish goods are technologically the best and if they are comparable in price, they will be bought no matter how they are paid for.

The fact that the Soviet Union has at present reduced export income is making the Western countries work harder and compete strongly with each other.

"This summer's somewhat pointed debate on Soviet trade has not brought the problem closer to a solution. The Finnish critics seem to forget that it was Finland that originally wanted to raise the limit for an interest free balance of up to 300 million rubles," Kaarlehto said.

The goal for this year's trade is unambiguous and clear. The clearing balance must not exceed 150 million rubles (1 billion marks). In 1989 the balance is to be zero.

The new development in the Soviet Union has made trade policy in the East much more interesting than before.

"Before it was just routine work. Now we must learn a completely new trade policy. This can only be done by analyzing what is happening in the Soviet Union. What is said in theory and how it is realized in practice."

NORWAY

Central Bank Chief Skanland Warns Against Additional Programs

36390079 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
27 Jul 88 p 8

[Interview by Yngve Hellestol and John Myhre; first two paragraphs are AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Norway cannot afford any additional social reforms, such as longer vacations or longer maternity leaves. Central Bank Chief Hermod Skanland says that we first have to get over the effects of the cutback in working hours before contemplating any new costly reforms.

A further decline in the level of interest rates, furthermore, depends on a continuation of the transition to gross income taxation, so that the advantages of deductions of interest payments are reduced.

Central Bank Chief Skanland clearly establishes that we cannot afford either longer vacations or longer maternity leaves in the next few years. The Norwegian economy is still struggling with the effects of the cutback in working hours.

"We gave priority to a cutback in work hours to 37.5 hours over other social reforms. For the time being, we have our hands full getting over the effects of that reform," says Skanland.

"However, later on when it becomes possible to carry through additional social reforms, I find that an extension of the maternity leave ought to be given priority. This is particularly important, since we need more children in Norway."

Income Legislation

"Are we now beginning to discern the effects of this year's wage and salary agreements and the introduction of the legislation governing income adjustments?"

"Yes. We already see the effects in the form of lower price increases. But, at the same time, we have to realize that what we are doing today is aimed at the nineties. In addition, we have to realize that the painful effects, such as an increased number of bankruptcies and a higher unemployment rate, will appear first. Only gradually will we see the effects of new and increased activity. Increased unemployment will be part of this transitional process. A decline in demand will lead to a lower growth rate and reduced pressure in the labor market, which will gradually be reflected in lower rates of price increases."

"Does Norway's economic situation require that the income adjustment law be extended to cover 1989 as well?"

"I do not wish to take a definite stand on this issue. However, the intention was that the idea underlying the legislation be carried through in the second labor agreement year as well. That need was recognized by all parties."

"Is there a danger that the income adjustment law will lead to an accumulation of wage demands which will appear at full force once the law is repealed?"

"There is always the problem associated with adjustment laws that one postpones problems. The task will therefore be to dismantle the law in a sensible manner, and it is to be hoped that we shall accomplish this in a better way than last time."

"How should the law be repealed?"

"I do not want to discuss this issue in detail. However, the fact that the labor market is not very tight, will, at the same time, make it easier to dismantle the law."

Decline in Interest Rate?

Central Bank Chief Skanland points out that the pressure on the Norwegian economy remains too strong. The foreign deficit is upwards of 20 billion kroner. That requires a further curb of the demand in Norway. It therefore will be a long time before we may expect any improvements in real incomes.

As far as the trend of interest rates is concerned, Skanland believes that a further decline is conceivable.

"A further decline in the interest rate is possible. But that presupposes a further decline in the inflation rate, at the same time as the tax revision, which reduces the advantages of deductions of interest incomes, is carried on. The tax rules are also of importance for the level of interest rates, and if the possibilities of deduction of interest payments on debts are reduced, this will contribute to bringing a balance to the credit market."

However, Skanland, at the same time, makes it clear that there are also indications pointing to the danger of an increase in interest rates.

"Unfortunately, one cannot exclude the possibility of an increase in the interest rate either. This is associated with the fact that the level of interest rates abroad is on its way upwards and that we still have a vulnerable economy, which, among other things, is dependent upon developments in the oil market," says Central Bank Chief Skanland.

GREECE

Poll Results on 3 Main Popular Concerns 35210138b Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Jul 88 p 45

[Text] About 46 percent of the population considers AIDS one of the three main problems Greek society is concerned with. The other two are nuclear (radiation-cloud) and unemployment. More specifically:

—59 percent of men and 66 percent of women consider radiation-cloud Greek society's top problem, while 58 percent of men and 51 percent of women think unemployment is the main problem.

—46 percent of men and 45 percent of women placed AIDS at the top of the list; 39 percent of men and 42 percent of women consider crime the main problem, while 28 percent of men and 32 percent of women are concerned with the possibility of war.

Only 15 percent of men and 13 percent of women placed traffic accidents at the top of the list, despite the fact that Greece has the greatest number of accidents in Europe annually.

7520/6091

Results of Newspaper Readership Polls by Education, Income, Occupation 35210138a Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21, 22 Jul 88

[Article by P. Makris and V. Netas; first two paragraphs are ELEVTHEROTYPIA introduction]

[21 Jul 88 pp 10-11]

[Text] Today ELEVTHEROTYPIA ["E"] enters the 14th year of its publication. Thanks to the efforts of its employees and the confidence shown by its readers, "E" has enjoyed the last 3 years a steady circulation rise from one month to the next. In May, "E's" average circulation was 128,000 and it is estimated that in June it will be over 140,000 copies.

Today's anniversary is dedicated to the public which honors this newspaper every day. On the basis of polls conducted by reliable firms (ICAP, Nielsen) we present a profile of our readers. Who are they in terms of education, sex, income, place of residence? The conclusions are useful to all of us.

Of the 20 daily newspapers published in Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA has the widest readership in the country among persons having university education and high monthly incomes (24.0-28.6 percent). By "readership" we mean the reading of a newspaper not only by a single

reader but also by most family members or members of a friendly group or the employees in a work place. In "readership" we also include the average time a reader "holds" the newspaper. "E" has an equally high readership level among the high level occupational groups (30 percent) as well as among the more dynamic, creative ages of 35 to 44 years (23 percent).

These classifications are based on public opinion polls conducted by two companies. "E" has the most readers among men (21 percent) while women who prefer "E" belong to the upper level of occupational and income groups.

To these facts, one should add "E's" steadily rising circulation throughout the country showing that the newspaper is a serious medium of information and of public life review as well as a decisive factor in influencing public opinion.

The relevant data which are derived from almost simultaneous polls by ICAP-Gallup and the Nielsen Marketing Research lead to the same conclusions despite minor variations and provide a better panoramic picture of the reading public's more specific preferences by place of residence, sex, age, income, occupation and education, family situation, etc.

The polls of the two firms cover approximately the same period. Specifically, the ICAP-Gallup study was conducted between 10 and 30 March 1988 while the Nielsen Marketing Research poll was conducted between 10 March and 3 April 1988.

ICAP used a total of 61 men and women researchers and 7 inspectors.

The persons to whom the questions were submitted were men and women over 15 years of age with a 100 percent coverage of the Greek population.

The researchers completed 2,000 questionnaires with responses from 44 locations—cities, towns, and villages (including the islands) with personal interviews (door to door of all those questioned).

The sampling was based on the "random" selection method with proportional distribution in terms of sex, age group, geographic area and size within the general population. Moreover, the questions referred to representative groups of the population in terms of their income and educational level.

Nielsen questioned 3,588 men and women 15 to 64 years old in continental Greece and Crete. Its poll took into account: social status (occupation, education, income); size of urban center where the persons polled lived; educational background, sex, etc.

Educational Level

The educational level is determined by the studies the readers pursued. The two firms separated them into three categories:

—ICAP makes a distinction between a. illiterates and those with primary school education, b. persons with junior and senior high school education, and c. persons who attended institutions of higher learning.

—Nielsen divides the readers into those with a. basic education (up to the 9th grade), b. secondary education (graduates of junior and senior high schools and secondary technical schools), and c. higher education (those who pursued studies in institutions of higher learning).

Income

The social status of the respondents is mainly determined by their income:

—ICAP divides this category into those with a monthly income of a. less than 30,000 drachmas, b. between 30,000 and 60,000, c. between 60,000 and 100,000, and d. 101,000 drachmas and over.

—Nielsen divides them into higher, middle and lower social groups based on their income.

Of course, the income does not always determine the social prestige or the educational level of the respondents. For this reason, both ICAP and Nielsen make a more specific distinction based on occupation. Thus, ICAP distinguishes between a. professionals, lawyers, accountants, supervisors, executives, entrepreneurs, store owners, small businessmen, and office employees and b. farmers, fishermen, technicians and workers, c. nonworking housewives and d. unemployed, students attending higher education institutions, high school students and retirees.

Graduates

Of the readers with higher education, 41 percent prefer "E" (ICAP data) while Nielsen, using different population data, raises this percentage to 43 percent. According to ICAP the readers with higher education are distributed as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 41 |
| TA NEA | 23 |
| ETHNOS | 17 |
| 24 ORES | 13 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 13 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 8 |

Table 1 (continued)

| Newspaper | Percent |
|--------------|---------|
| APOGEVMATINI | 7 |
| EXPRESS | 6 |
| PROTI | 6 |
| MESIMVRINI | 5 |
| VRADYNI | 4 |
| KATHIMERINI | 4 |
| KERDOS | 3 |
| AKROPOLIS | 2 |
| AVGI | 2 |
| AVRIANI | 2 |
| ESTIA | 1 |

Nielsen, however, for the last 7 days of its study gives top place to "E" in terms of readership among the readers with higher education (37 percent). The percentages for all newspapers are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

| Newspaper | Percent |
|--------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 37.0 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 17.1 |
| ETHNOS | 16.1 |
| NEA | 15.3 |
| 24 ORES | 13.4 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 8.1 |
| PROTI | 7.0 |
| KATHIMERINI | 6.1 |
| VRADYNI | 6.0 |
| AVRIANI | 5.9 |
| MESIMVRINI | 5.6 |
| AVGI | 2.0 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1.5 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 0.6 |

Throughout the Country

For the entire country and throughout the week, Nielsen finds "E" holding first place among readers with higher education. The percentages are shown in Table 3.

Table 3

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 37.0 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 17.1 |
| ETHNOS | 16.1 |
| NEA | 15.3 |
| 24 ORES | 13.4 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 8.1 |
| PROTI | 7.0 |
| KATHIMERINI | 6.1 |
| VRADYNI | 6.0 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 5.9 |
| MESIMVRINI | 5.6 |

Table 3 (continued)

| Newspaper | Percent |
|--------------------|---------|
| AVRIANI | 3.6 |
| AVGI | 2.0 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1.5 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 0.6 |

"E" holds top place among readers of this category (higher education) in the area of Athens as well.

In the total of Greek readers with higher education, the preference percentages are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------------------------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 36.9 (37.2 percent women) |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 19.6 (12.9 percent women) |
| ETHNOS | 16.3 (15.9 percent women) |
| NEA | 16.1 (14.0 percent women) |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 8.6 (7.2 percent women) |
| KATHIMERINI | 7.2 (4.1 percent women) |
| APOGEVMATINI | 6.5 (4.7 percent women) |
| MESIMVRINI | 5.9 (5.0 percent women) |
| AVRIANI | 4.0 (2.8 percent women) |
| VRADYNI | 4.0 (4.2 percent women) |
| AVGI | 2.5 (1.0 percent women) |
| AKROPOLIS | 2.3 (0.3 percent women) |

Composition of Our Readers

The ICAP poll took into account the composition of our readers by level of education, income and occupation (Tables 5-7).

Table 5. Level of Education (in percent)

| Newspaper | Primary | Secondary | Higher |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|--------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 5 | 11 | 26 |
| ETHNOS | 8 | 16 | 11 |
| TA NEA | 3 | 9 | 15 |
| AKROPOLIS | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| APOGEVMATINI | — | — | 1 |
| AVGI | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| AVRIANI | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| VRADYNI | 1 | 6 | 6 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 4 | 11 | 8 |
| 24 ORES | — | — | 1 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| KATHIMERINI | — | 2 | 3 |
| MESIMVRINI | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| PROTI | 1 | — | — |
| RIZOSPASTIS | — | — | — |

Table 6. Monthly Income (in percent)

| Newspaper | Up to 30,000 Drachmas | 30,000-60,000 Drachmas | 60,000-100,000 Drachmas | 100,000 Drachmas and Over |
|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 7 | 12 | 21 | 24 |
| ETHNOS | 8 | 17 | 20 | 20 |
| TA NEA | 3 | 7 | 11 | 23 |
| AKROPOLIS | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 6 | 8 | 8 | 7 |
| AVGI | 1 | — | 1 | 1 |
| AVRIANI | 4 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| VRADYNI | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | — | — | — | 1 |
| 24 ORES | 1 | 4 | 9 | 14 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 6 | 7 | 13 | 15 |
| KATHIMERINI | 2 | 1 | 3 | — |
| MESIMVRINI | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| PROTI | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 |

Table 7. Occupation (in percent)

| Newspaper | Professionals, Lawyers, Executives, Entrepreneurs, Store Owners, Small Businessmen, Office Employees | Farmers, Fishermen, Technicians, Workers | Nonworking Housewives | Unemployed Students, Retirees |
|--------------------|--|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 30 | 10 | 11 | 14 |
| ETHNOS | 21 | 22 | 17 | 13 |
| TA NEA | 18 | 7 | 9 | 10 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| AVGI | 1 | 1 | — | 1 |
| AVRIANI | 3 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| VRADYNI | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 1 | — | — | — |
| 24 ORES | 12 | 4 | 6 | 8 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 16 | 8 | 8 | 9 |
| KATHIMERINI | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| MESIMVRINI | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| PROTI | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 6 | 5 | 4 | 4 |

[22 Jul 88 pp 36-37]

[Text]

Salonica, Large Cities Prefer 'E'

According to the ICAP poll Salonica and the major provincial cities prefer "E" above all Athenian dailies. This is the most characteristic conclusion in the second part of "E's" offering to its readers on the occasion of its 14th anniversary since it first appeared on 21 July 1975.

Another significant point is that "E" is first in terms of readership. The tables published yesterday and today show that "E" is ahead among educated and higher income readers as well as among people in the dynamic age groups.

The double reference to the same question is due to the questions: Which newspaper did you read yesterday and which during the past 7 days?

According to the ICAP study, among readers with a monthly income of 100,000 drachmas or more, "E" leads all newspapers with 24 percent as Table 8 shows.

Table 8

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 24 |
| NEA | 23 |
| ETHNOS | 20 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 15 |
| 24 ORES | 14 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 7 |
| NAVTEMBORIKI | 5 |

Table 8 (continued)

| Newspaper | Percent |
|-------------|---------|
| RIZOSPASTIS | 4 |
| KATHIMERINI | 3 |
| AVRIANI | 3 |
| PROTI | 2 |
| KERDOS | 2 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1 |
| ESTIA | 1 |
| AVGI | 1 |

Nielsen finds "E" holding first place in terms of readership among Athens readers in the higher socioeconomic group (Table 9).

Table 9

| Newspaper | Percent |
|--------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 28.6 |
| NEA | 26.6 |
| ETHNOS | 26.2 |
| 24 ORES | 23.4 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 15.2 |
| AVRIANI | 8.4 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 8.3 |
| PROTI | 7.6 |
| KATHIMERINI | 6.6 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 5.6 |
| MESIMVRINI | 5.2 |
| AVGI | 3.4 |
| AKROPOLIS | 2.0 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 1.4 |

Nationwide, Nielsen gives "E" first place among readers in the higher socioeconomic group as shown in Table 10.

Table 10

| Newspaper | Percent |
|--------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 27.7 |
| ETHNOS | 21.10 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 17.2 |
| NEA | 17.0 |
| 24 ORES | 15.9 |
| MAKEDONIA | 10.7 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 9.6 |
| PROTI | 6.6 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 6.5 |
| THESSALONIKI | 5.8 |
| AVRIANI | 5.7 |
| VRADYNI | 5.3 |
| MESIMVRINI | 5.2 |
| KATHIMERINI | 4.6 |
| AVGI | 1.9 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1.7 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 0.9 |
| ELEVTHEROS | 0.6 |
| KATHE MERA | 0.3 |

35-44 Age Group

ICAP gives the readership percentages with regard to the 35-44 age group—the most active and productive group as shown in Table 11.

Table 11

| Newspaper | Percent |
|--------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 23 |
| ETHNOS | 22 |
| NEA | 14 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 12 |
| 24 ORES | 10 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 7 |
| PROTI | 4 |
| ESTIA | 3 |
| MESIMVRINI | 2 |
| NAVTEMBORIKI | 2 |
| ELEVTHERI ORA | 2 |
| KATHIMERINI | 1 |
| AVGI | 1 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 1 |

By Readership

ICAP gives the data for the entire country with regard to the newspapers read the previous day as shown in Table 12.

Table 12 (in percent)

| Newspaper | Men | Women |
|----------------|-----|-------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 11 | 14 |
| ETHNOS | 11 | 14 |
| NEA | 7 | 8 |

Table 12 (in percent) (continued)

| Newspaper | Men | Women |
|---------------------|-----|-------|
| ELEVTHEROS | 7 | 9 |
| TYPOS | 6 | 4 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 5 | 5 |
| 24 ORES | 4 | 3 |
| MAKEDONIA | 4 | 3 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 3 | 2 |
| AVRIANI | 3 | 2 |
| VRADYNI | 2 | 2 |
| PROTI | 2 | 1 |
| MESIMVRINI | 2 | 2 |
| THESSALONIKI | 1 | 1 |
| KATHIMERINI | 1 | 1 |
| EXPRESS | 1 | 1 |
| NAVTEMBORIKI | 1 | — |
| AVGI—less than | 1 | — |
| AKROPOLIS—less than | 1 | — |
| KERDOS—less than | 1 | — |
| ESTIA—less than | 1 | — |
| EL. VORAS—less than | 1 | — |
| ELEV. ORA—less than | 1 | — |
| Other | 5 | 3 |
| Sports | 5 | 1 |
| Did not read | 46 | 58 |
| Total | 122 | 132 |
| | | 113 |

The above data show that:

—Almost half of all Greeks (46 percent) do not read any daily newspaper at all. We note that this is a high percentage.

—22 percent of all readers (32 percent men and 13 percent women) read more than one newspaper.

The detailed data of the ICAP-Gallup study in terms of age groups, educational level, monthly family income, region, etc., show significant variations in the public's preferences especially with regard to the three top newspapers which share the largest readership.

Income Levels

With minor variations ICAP gives the percentages of readers in the higher social class as shown in Table 13.

Table 13

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 30 |
| ETHNOS | 21 |
| NEA | 18 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 16 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 7 |

Table 13 (continued)

| Newspaper | Percent |
|---------------|---------|
| RIZOSPASTIS | 6 |
| MESIMVRINI | 4 |
| EXPRESS | 4 |
| AVRIANI | 3 |
| VRADYNI | 3 |
| KATHIMERINI | 3 |
| KERDOS | 2 |
| AVGI | 1 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1 |
| ELEVTHERI ORA | 1 |

To the total semiurban and farm population and among readers with monthly incomes exceeding 136,000 drachmas, Nielsen gives the readership percentages as shown in Table 14.

Table 14

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 32.1 |
| ETHNOS | 22.2 |
| VRADYNI | 14.6 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 11.6 |
| MESIMVRINI | 10.1 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 9.9 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 7.5 |
| AVRIANI | 4.4 |
| AKROPOLIS | 3.5 |
| NEA | 3.5 |
| AVGI | 1.3 |

In the same areas, Nielsen gives the readership percentages among readers with incomes of 56,001 to 92,000 drachmas as shown in Table 15.

Table 15

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 12.0 |
| ETHNOS | 16.0 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 10.6 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 6.4 |
| NEA | 6.3 |
| 24 ORES | 4.4 |
| AVRIANI | 4.1 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 3.3 |
| MESIMVRINI | 1.7 |
| PROTI | 1.6 |
| KATHIMERINI | 1.8 |

In the Cities

"E" is in first place among residents of cities with populations of 50,000 to 150,000 as shown in Table 16.

Table 16

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 38 |
| ETHNOS | 25 |
| NEA | 18 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 9 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 6 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 5 |
| PROTI | 4 |

For readers of semiurban and farm centers Nielsen gives the percentages as shown in Table 17.

Table 17

| Newspaper | Percent |
|------------------|---------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 21.0 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 23.1 |
| ETHNOS | 20.0 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 10.0 |
| NEA | 8.2 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 7.4 |
| VRADYNI | 6.8 |
| AVRIANI | 4.0 |
| AKROPOLIS | 2.5 |

What Have You Read the Past 7 Days?

The responses to the question "which dailies have you read the last 7 days" show that "E" had the highest percentage of readership: 41 percent of the readers had higher education and 24 percent represented readers with a monthly income of over 100,000 drachmas.

At the same time "E" has other preferences also as the detailed data show: 31 percent of those questioned did not read any daily newspaper at all (men 20 percent, women 41 percent).

Composition of Our Readers

By City

By city, the ICAP data show other variations. The superiority of "E" is evident in urban centers with 50,001 to 150,000 residents where, according to contemporary social changes, the medium and high level occupations and the corresponding classes of intellectuals and rentiers are flourishing. Table 18 refers to newspapers which were read yesterday.

Table 18 (in percent)

| Newspaper | Cities | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|--------|----------|----------------|---------------|--------------|-----------|-------|--|
| | Athens | Salonica | 50,001-150,000 | 10,001-50,000 | 2,001-10,000 | 501-2,000 | 1-500 | |
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 13 | 10 | 25 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 10 | |
| ETHNOS | 13 | 4 | 13 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 12 | |
| TA NEA | 17 | — | 11 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 1 | |
| AKROPOLIS | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | |
| APOGEVMATINI | 7 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 7 | |
| AVGI | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | — | — | — | |
| AVRIANI | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | |
| VRADYNI | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | |
| 24 ORES | 13 | 4 | 13 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 12 | |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 8 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 11 | 2 | 8 | |
| KATHIMERINI | 1 | — | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | |
| MESIMVRINI | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |
| PROTI | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 3 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | |

By Age

"E" has the highest percentage of readers in the 25 to 34 years age group with the highest level of social and political involvement. The ICAP study (Table 19) gives the following percentages, by age groups, regarding newspapers read yesterday.

Table 19 (in percent)

| Newspapers | Age Groups | | | | | |
|--------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| | 15-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-64 | Over 65 |
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 12 | 18 | 14 | 8 | 8 | 4 |
| ETHNOS | 14 | 17 | 14 | 10 | 6 | 5 |
| TA NEA | 6 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 5 |
| AKROPOLIS | 2 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 7 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | 1 |
| AVGI | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| AVRIANI | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| VRADYNI | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 8 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| 24 ORES | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| KATHIMERINI | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | — |
| MESIMVRINI | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| PROTI | — | — | — | 2 | 1 | — |
| RIZOSPASTIS | — | — | — | — | — | — |

By Income (Monthly)

There are variations by family as shown in Table 20 which refers to newspapers read yesterday. The data show that those with incomes of over 100,000 drachmas prefer "E," TA NEA, ETHNOS, 24 ORES, etc.

Table 20 (in percent)

| Newspaper | Income | | | |
|--------------------|---------|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| | -30,000 | 30,000-60,000 | 60,000-100,000 | Over 100,000 |
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 5 | 8 | 13 | 16 |
| ETHNOS | 3 | 13 | 11 | 14 |
| TA NEA | 1 | 5 | 6 | 16 |
| AKROPOLIS | 2 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| APOGEVMATINI | — | — | — | 1 |
| AVGI | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| AVRIANI | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| VRADYNI | 3 | 13 | 11 | 14 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| 24 ORES | — | 1 | — | 2 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| KATHIMERINI | — | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| MESIMVRINI | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| PROTI | 2 | 1 | — | — |
| RIZOSPASTIS | — | — | — | — |

By Educational Level

With regard to newspapers read in the last 7 days the ICAP data show variations in the educational level of the readers as shown in Table 21.

Table 21 (in percent)

| Newspaper | Level of Education | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------|
| | Elementary | Secondary | Higher |
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 7 | 20 | 41 |
| ETHNOS | 14 | 23 | 17 |
| TA NEA | 5 | 15 | 23 |
| AKROPOLIS | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 7 | 9 | 7 |
| AVGI | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| AVRIANI | 6 | 5 | 2 |
| VRADYNI | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | — | 1 | — |
| 24 ORES | 2 | 12 | 13 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 5 | 16 | 13 |
| KATHIMERINI | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| MESIMVRINI | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| PROTI | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 4 | 4 | 8 |

By Occupation

ICAP data give the percentages by reader occupation as shown in Table 22. They refer to newspapers read during the previous 7 days.

Table 22 (in percent)

| Newspaper | Professionals: Lawyers, Executives, Entrepreneurs, Businessmen, Store Owners, Small Businessmen, Office Employees | Farmers, Fishermen, Technicians, Workers | Nonworking Housewives | Unemployed, Students, Retirees |
|--------------------|---|--|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 21 | 6 | 5 | 8 |
| ETHNOS | 14 | 14 | 10 | 8 |
| TA NEA | 12 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| AKROPOLIS | — | — | — | 2 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 6 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| AVGI | 1 | — | — | 1 |
| AVRIANI | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| VRADYNI | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | — | — | — | — |
| 24 ORES | 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 11 | 6 | 4 | 6 |
| KATHIMERINI | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| MESIMVRINI | 3 | — | 2 | 1 |
| PROTI | 3 | 1 | — | 1 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 |

By Sex

Necessary Explanations

The data in Table 23 refer to the total of readers by sex. The table refers to newspapers read during the previous 7 days.

Table 23 (in percent)

| Newspaper | Total | Men | Women |
|--------------------|-------|-----|-------|
| ELEVTHEROTYPIA | 17 | 21 | 14 |
| ETHNOS | 18 | 21 | 15 |
| TA NEA | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| AKROPOLIS | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| APOGEVMATINI | 8 | 8 | 7 |
| AVGI | 1 | 1 | — |
| AVRIANI | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| VRADYNI | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS | — | 1 | — |
| 24 ORES | 8 | 9 | 7 |
| ELEVTHEROS TYPOS | 11 | 13 | 9 |
| KATHIMERINI | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| MESIMVRINI | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| PROTI | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| RIZOSPASTIS | 5 | 5 | 4 |


1. The readers of the tables have a reasonable question: How is it possible for the total to exceed 100 percent?

ICAP explains that the excess by 10, 20, 30 or even 35 percentage points is due to the fact that some people read two or more newspapers in the course of a day or a week.

2. The studies by both ICAP and Nielsen were conducted at their initiative and without any previous communication or request by "E."

3. The practical significance of having separate polls by a week or by a single separate day consists in the fact that certain readers have the habit or the [financial] ability to select their newspapers during the week according to the major news item or the social, political, cultural and economic events or the permanent columns carried by a newspaper.

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